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ABSTRACT 
 
Bayesian-LOPA Methodology for Risk Assessment of an LNG Importation Terminal.  
(December 2007) 
Geun Woong Yun, B.S., SungKyunKwan University; 
M.S., YonSei University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Sam Mannan 
 
LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) is one of the fastest growing energy sources in the 
U.S. to fulfill the increasing energy demands. In order to meet the LNG demand, many 
LNG facilities including LNG importation terminals are operating currently. Therefore, 
it is important to estimate the potential risks in LNG terminals to ensure their safety.  
One of the best ways to estimate the risk is LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis) 
because it can provide quantified risk results with less time and efforts than other 
methods. For LOPA application, failure data are essential to compute risk frequencies. 
However, the failure data from the LNG industry are very sparse. Bayesian estimation is 
identified as one method to compensate for its weaknesses. It can update the generic data 
with plant specific data.  
Based on Bayesian estimation, the frequencies of initiating events were obtained 
using a conjugate gamma prior distribution such as OREDA (Offshore Reliability Data) 
database and Poisson likelihood distribution. If there is no prior information, Jeffreys 
noninformative prior may be used. The LNG plant failure database was used as plant 
specific likelihood information.  
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The PFDs (Probability of Failure on Demand) of IPLs (Independent Protection 
Layers) were estimated with the conjugate beta prior such as EIReDA (European 
Industry Reliability Data Bank) database and binomial likelihood distribution. In some 
cases EIReDA did not provide failure data, so the newly developed Frequency-PFD 
conversion method was used instead. By the combination of Bayesian estimation and 
LOPA procedures, the Bayesian-LOPA methodology was developed and was applied to 
an LNG importation terminal. The found risk values were compared to the tolerable risk 
criteria to make risk decisions. Finally, the risk values of seven incident scenarios were 
compared to each other to make a risk ranking.  
In conclusion, the newly developed Bayesian-LOPA methodology really does 
work well in an LNG importation terminal and it can be applied in other industries 
including refineries and petrochemicals. Moreover, it can be used with other frequency 
analysis methods such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) refers to natural gas converted into liquid state by 
super cooling to -260℉ (-162.2℃). LNG commonly consists of 85% - 98% methane 
with the remainder as a combination of nitrogen, carbon dioxide, ethane, propane, and 
other heavier hydrocarbon gases. It is highly flammable when it forms a 5 – 15% 
volumetric concentration mixture with air at atmospheric conditions. 
Based on its properties and that the volume compresses 600 times from gas phase 
into its liquid phase, the super cooling process of LNG is performed at a temperature of  
-260℉ under atmospheric pressure. It provides cost-effective LNG containment, and the 
liquid phase also permits cost effective LNG transportation across great distances 
onshore and offshore, at atmospheric pressure. Moreover, LNG is environmental 
friendly because of clean burning. Therefore, LNG demand has been growing to 
diversify the energy portfolios and fulfill the energy demand for LNG as a fuel of 
heating, cooling, cooking and power generation, etc. LNG may play an important role in 
filling the gap between supply and demand of energy in North America.  
With increasing demand for LNG, there are at least 113 currently active LNG 
facilities across the U.S., including importation terminals, operating and storage facilities 
for use during periods of peak natural gas demand (“peak shaving”) or as a baseload 
source of natural gas (see Table 1.1). In addition, there are also a number of proposed 
projects for LNG terminals in North America. In order to fulfill the LNG demand, it is 
necessary to build and operate more LNG importation terminals to import LNG from 
other countries. Thus, this research will focus on the LNG importation terminals. 
 
 
 
—————————— 
This thesis follows the style of Process Safety Progress. 
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Although the LNG industry speaks to the excellent safety record of the past 40 
years, the risk related with LNG facilities may be increased with the growing LNG 
industry. It is important to continue this safety record given that one major accident 
could severely impact one community and the entire industry. In that light, risk-based 
decisions founded on sound science are very important. Emergency plans can be 
improved by application of risk-based criteria. 
 
Table 1.1  The number of LNG facilities 
 
Classification 
No. of 
Facilities 
(2006) 
Description 
Export terminal 
(baseload) 
1 
The natural gas coming by pipe from one or several 
gas fields is liquefied and then stored for subsequent 
transport to other destinations. 
Receiving terminal 
(importation) 
5 
LNG carriers (ships) are unloaded. LNG is stored in 
tanks, vaporized and sent to the gas networks or gas 
consumers. LNG receiving terminals can have 
loading stations for road, rail, barge or small LNG 
carriers. 
Peak-shaving plant 39 
This plant is connected to a gas network. During the 
period of the year when gas demand is low, natural 
gas is liquefied and LNG is stored. LNG is vaporized 
during short periods, when gas demand is high. 
Satellite plant 58 
This plant is connected to a gas network or gas 
consumers. LNG is supplied by road tankers, rail, 
barge or small LNG carriers. LNG is stored in 
insulated pressure vessels, vaporized and sent to the 
network [1]. 
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Therefore, it is essential to control the risk related to LNG facilities to ensure their 
safety and reliability so that countries can enjoy the benefits of LNG. In order to control 
and quantify the risk, it is important to apply risk assessment methodology such as the 
layer of protection analysis (LOPA). From this quantification of risk and the application 
of recommendations for the LNG importation terminal, the LNG safety can be improved. 
LOPA is one of the risk assessment methods, which is called semi-quantitative method 
because it can provide quantified results of frequency even though it can present 
qualitative results of consequence or severity. LOPA is a simplified form of risk 
assessment which uses initiating event frequency, consequence severity, and the 
probability of failure on demand (PFD) of independent protection layers (IPLs) to 
estimate the risk of a possible incident scenario. The method is very straightforward and 
systematic to get the risk values rather than quantitative risk assessment (QRA). In other 
words, it does not demand a lot of time or man hours for the LOPA application and is 
very cost-effective: thus, it has been used widely in the process industry. 
Applying LOPA methodology to LNG facilities needs failure data of equipment 
and facilities to quantify the risk. However, these plant specific data are very sparse in 
LNG industries because there have been only a few incidents in the history of LNG 
industry and historical failure data have not been well gathered yet. The risk values 
estimated with these insufficient data may not show exactly the condition of a specific 
LNG facility. Generic failure data from other industries such as refineries, 
petrochemicals, and nuclear industries may be used for the LNG industry to estimate the 
risk. However, these data also may not give appropriate results of risk in LNG industries 
because the operational condition and environment of LNG facilities are quite different 
from those of other industries.  
 Thus, it is necessary to use the Bayesian logic to find out more reliable risk 
values using both scarce plant specific data and generic data from other industries. 
Bayesian logic can produce the updated failure data with the prior information of generic 
failure data and the likelihood information of LNG plant specific data. The updated data 
can reflect both statistical failure data from generic data which have sufficient and long-
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term historical database and the LNG plant specific data which have been gathered from 
the LNG industry. Using Bayesian logic may produce more reliable data because it is 
based on systematic logic and statistics. 
 Consequently, as the demands of LNG facilities increase, the need to estimate the 
risk of the facilities is also growing. LOPA is one of the systematic risk assessment 
methodologies which can provide quantified risk values quickly with failure data of 
equipment and facilities. For industries with sparse failure data such as LNG or space 
industry, the Bayesian-LOPA methodology, which is a combination with LOPA and 
Bayesian logic, can give more accurate and reliable results of risk assessment by 
considering both generic data with long-term historical records and plant specific data 
from that facility. Therefore, in this research, Bayesian-LOPA methodology will be 
developed and then be applied to an LNG importation terminal to estimate the risk with 
generic data and LNG plant specific data. Finally, the method will serve as a risk 
decision measure and a tool to make some recommendations for safety enhancement. 
 
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Changing economic outlook, energy demand, and environmental factors have 
resulted in increased demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG). The availability, 
profitability, and relatively low environmental impact of LNG will drive many capital 
projects for LNG facilities over the next several years. With so many facilities being 
brought to operation by numerous firms and operators, there is need of guidance by risk 
assessment methods such as LOPA to ensure that proven safety fundamentals are 
incorporated into the projects and also the facilities are satisfied with the risk criteria. 
LNG is an extremely cold, nontoxic, non-corrosive substance that is stored at 
atmospheric pressure. It is refrigerated, rather than pressurized, which enables LNG to 
be an effective, economical method of transporting large volumes of natural gas over 
long distance. LNG itself poses little danger as long as it is contained within storage 
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tanks, piping, and equipment designed for use at LNG cryogenic conditions. However, if 
it is accidentally released in an uncontrolled manner from its containment system, LNG 
may cause dangerous events from its flammable and cryogenic characteristics. 
In order to use the LOPA to LNG terminals, the following information is 
required: hazard identification to find out possible hazards, failure rates and probability 
of failure on demands (PFD) by using Bayesian logic. Thus, it is necessary to review 
LNG characteristics (i.e. properties, hazards) and terminals, LOPA applications, and 
Bayesian logic applications for LOPA application of LNG terminals. 
 
1.2.1. LNG HAZARDS AND DESCRIPTION OF AN LNG TERMINAL 
 
West and Mannan [2] identified the LNG hazards [3] and summarized the history 
of LNG incidents. Among the many hazards, vapor cloud flash fires and pool fires are 
two main types of hazards that have potential impact on a plant that handles LNG and 
the adjacent area. For petroleum-based liquids and gases, the well recognized hazards 
are those associated with the flammability. However, LNG presents a few special 
hazards due to its low temperature characteristics. The hazard identification which can 
identify what hazards may exist at LNG facilities and make possible incident scenarios is 
the preliminary step of LOPA, and therefore it is important to know what hazards may 
exist in LNG terminals. West and Mannan considered several hazards such as cryogenic, 
over-pressurization, vapor cloud flash fire, unconfined vapor cloud explosion (UVCE), 
confined space explosion, pool fire, torch fire, BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding 
Vapor Explosion), Rollover, and RPT (Rapid Phase Transition). However, they 
described UVCE may not be a potential hazard in LNG facilities because normally LNG 
facilities, which do not have condensed piping and equipment, may not be able to cause 
vapor clouds.  
Cryogenic hazards include the cryogenic burns associated with the freezing of 
skin because of direct contact with LNG (-260˚F), c
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important hazard is the impact of low temperatures on containment materials and 
structural materials. For example, if carbon steel contacts LNG, it loses ductility and 
then the impact strength (ability to withstand an impact force) decreases. 
The potential for over-pressurization is a recognized hazard in facilities that 
handle refrigerated or liquefied gases. It is often possible to isolate a vessel or a portion 
of a pipe by closing valves at both ends while the vessel or pipe contains a significant 
quantity of cryogenic liquid. If the temperature of the liquid is increased due to heat leak 
through an insulating cover, the liquid will expand due to the temperature increase and 
will vaporize. The vapor generation will cause the pressure within the vessel or pipe to 
increase and may ultimately result in vessel or pipe rupture, particularly if safety 
protective equipment such as pressure relief valves is unavailable. 
Whenever LNG is released from its containment system, the liquid will be heated 
by the surroundings, and then cause the liquid gas to vaporize. The vapor generated by 
this boiling liquid will start to mix with the surrounding air and will be carried 
downwind with the air, and then create a vapor cloud. As the vapor continues to be 
carried downwind, it will mix with additional air and be further diluted. Some portion of 
the vapor cloud will be within the flammable limits (about 5-15% by volume). If this 
flammable portion encounters a source of ignition, the vapor cloud may ignite. The 
flame might then propagate through the cloud, back to the source of the vapor, 
particularly if the flammable portion of the cloud is continuous. 
In closed areas, ignition of a flammable natural gas mixture may cause an 
explosion, with the resulting damaging overpressures. If LNG or its vapor may be leaked 
into an enclosure (control room, compressor building, etc.), the possibility of an 
explosion is markedly increased. This is due to the pressure increase within the 
enclosure caused by the fire heating the air, and the increase in gas volume during 
combustion. Most buildings will withstand very little internal pressure and when the 
pressure limit is reached, the building literally explodes. 
An LNG leak or spill of sufficient size may result in an accumulation of liquid on 
the ground. If ignited, the resulting fire is known as a pool fire. Ignition can occur at the 
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pool location (either immediately or after some delay), or the pool can be ignited by a 
vapor cloud fire. Objects directly contacted by the flame above the pool can be severely 
damaged or destroyed, and exposed personnel would receive extensive burn injuries. 
Objects and personnel outside the actual flame volume also can be damaged or injured 
by the radiant heat emitted by the flame. Compared to a vapor cloud fire, the effects are 
more localized, but of longer duration.  
When a flammable liquid is accidentally released from pressurized containment, 
the leak may take the form of a spray of liquid droplets and vapor. If ignited, the 
resulting fire is termed a torch fire. The fire can also result from a pressurized vapor leak. 
Torch fires present the same types of hazards as pool fires, i.e., direct flame contact and 
radiant heating. However, the radiant heating power of a torch fire is often greater than 
that of a pool fire of similar size. 
A BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) is the catastrophic 
failure of a pressurized container when its contents are above their boiling point 
temperature. The most common type of BLEVE occurs when an un-insulated 
pressurized vessel is exposed to an adjacent fire. The fire increases the internal pressure 
and weakens the vessel until it can no longer contain the pressure. The vessel then 
ruptures violently, and parts of it may be propelled great distances. The released liquid 
flashes and atomizes immediately, often resulting in a large fireball. The fireball can 
cause very widespread damage due to flame contact and thermal radiation. Although the 
fireball lasts only a few seconds, its effects can be devastating. The probability of a 
BLEVE of an LNG storage tank is extremely small; since the main tank is protected by 
the outer tank and insulation that would prevent the heat transfer from a fire to reach the 
main tank. Furthermore, most LNG storage tanks are designed for relatively low 
operating pressures. Therefore, if the tanks are exposed to fire, they will not get BLEVE 
since they will fail at a fairly low internal pressure and, at the time of failure, the LNG 
would not be heated sufficiently to cause any significant quantity of liquid to flash to 
vapor.  
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LNG is a mixture primarily of methane and higher hydrocarbons. Weathering 
within an ocean going tanker or a peak–shaving storage tank can produce a density 
variation in the LNG. Addition of a new cargo of LNG can stratify within a storage tank, 
unless mixing procedures are adequate. After a period, the stratified layer may equalize 
in density with above layers and suddenly “rollover” to the surface of the tank. This type 
of sudden vaporization can cause tank over-pressurization. The 49 CFR regulation [4] 
specifically addresses this hazard. 
A flameless vapor phase explosion is caused by the sudden vaporization of a cold 
liquid upon contact with a much warmer material. The phenomenon of rapid vapor 
formation with loud “bangs” has been observed when LNG is released on water. This 
non-flaming physical interaction is referred to as “Rapid Phase Transition” or 
“Flameless Explosion”. It is believed that RPT will not propagate into a significantly 
larger damaging scenario [2]. 
The specification of LNG terminals is given in the industrial standards such as 
NFPA and EN standard as well as regulatory codes such as CFR (Code of Federal 
Regulations). EN 1473 [1, 5], which is European Standard, specifies the design 
requirements of LNG facilities as well as key requirements of hazard assessment 
guidelines and criteria to be used in the design for siting and safety. EN 1473 highlights 
the methodology of hazard assessment, identification of hazards and scenarios, and 
estimation of probabilities. The standard also shows the specification of LNG facilities 
including importation terminals and also gives detail requirements of equipment and 
systems such as storage systems, pumps, vaporization systems, pipelines, control 
systems and also protection systems. 
 NFPA 59A [6], which is the U.S. standard of National Fire Protection 
Association, includes the design requirements and specification of plant layout, materials, 
storage containers, protection devices and instrumentation devices of LNG facilities. It 
also shows test intervals of equipment and protection devices as shown in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2   Test intervals of equipment and protection devices [6, 7] 
 
System or equipment Test intervals Reference 
Control systems 
(control valves, sensing, automatic 
shutdown devices) 
1 year [6] 
Stationary LNG tank relief valves 2 years [6] 
Other relief valves 5 years [6] 
Emergency power sources 1 month [6] 
Hoses 1 year [6] 
Gas detector 1 month [7] 
Fire detector 6 months [7] 
Pressure alarm 1 month [7] 
Temperature alarm 1 month [7] 
ESD logic system 3 months [7] 
Vacuum breaker (VRV) 1 year [7] 
Level detector 1 year [7] 
Temperature sensor (base-slab) 1 year [7] 
Brine heating system 1 year [7] 
Control valve 1 year [7] 
Pressure relief valve (PRV) 1 year [7] 
ESD valve 1 month [7] 
Pump 1 month [7] 
Compressor 1 month [7] 
 
The test intervals may be used to estimate the number of demands to compute the 
probability of failure on demand. 
 The part 193 of 49 CFR [4] covers the regulatory requirements of LNG facilities. 
It defines that control system is a component, or system of components functioning as a 
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unit, including control valves and sensing, warning, relief, shutdown, and other control 
devices, which is activated either manually or automatically to establish or maintain the 
performance. It also specifies the test periods of control systems in service, but not 
normally in operation as such that relief valves and automatic shutdown devices should 
be tested once each calendar year, and control systems that are intended for fire 
protection should be tested at least two times each year. The test period is similar to the 
one of NFPA, but CFR requires more frequent test intervals in control system for fire 
protection system. 
LNG has been transported and used safely in the U.S. and worldwide for roughly 
40 years. Safety in the LNG industry is accomplished by providing multiple layers of 
protection for both the safety of LNG industry workers and the safety of communities 
that surround LNG facilities. These layers were summarized by Alderman [5]. This 
information may be used to determine the IPL of incident scenarios. 
Primary containment which can affect the frequency of initiating events is the 
first and most important requirement for containing the LNG product. This first layer of 
protection which is a part of inherent safer design involves the use of appropriate 
materials for LNG facilities as well as proper engineering design of LNG containers 
onshore, offshore, and on LNG ships. Both NFPA 59A [6] and EN 1473 [1] contain 
requirements for container design, including seismic criteria, thermal insulation, 
foundations, instrumentation, relief devices, and connections. The material selected for 
tanks, piping, and other equipment that comes in contact with LNG are high nickel 
content steels, aluminum, and stainless steels, which prevent embrittlement and material 
failures. 
Secondary containment ensures that if leak or spills occur at the LNG facility, the 
LNG can be fully contained and isolated. In many installations, a second tank such as 
secondary concrete or metal wall is used to surround the LNG container and serves as 
the secondary containment. Secondary containment systems are designed to exceed the 
volume of the LNG container for ground installations and dikes surrounding the LNG 
container are built to capture the product in case of a spill. NFPA 59A [6] requires that 
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LNG containers be provided with a natural barrier, dike impounding wall, or 
combination to contain a leak or spill of LNG. Additionally, a drainage system can be 
used to remove the LNG to a holding area where the LNG can vaporize safely. 
LNG operations use technologies such as high level alarms and multiple backup 
systems, which include Emergency Shutdown (ESD) systems, for safety protections. 
Fire and gas detection and fire fighting systems all combine to limit effects if there is a 
release. The LNG facility operator then takes actions by establishing necessary operating 
procedures, training, emergency response systems, and regular maintenance to protect 
people, property, and the environment from any release. 
It is very important to detect a leak of LNG or natural gas for emergency 
response actions to begin. Hydrocarbon gas detectors can be used to detect a natural gas 
leak if properly located. Hydrocarbon detectors need to be located higher than suspected 
leak points because natural gas is lighter than air. Hydrocarbon detectors are generally 
located over vaporizers, in metering stations, and in buildings where natural gas is 
processed. However, hydrocarbon detectors may not detect a LNG spill because vapors 
are insufficient. To back up the hydrocarbon detectors, temperature detection is used to 
sense a spill of LNG. The set point for the alarm is set low enough that ambient freezing 
conditions do not cause a fault trip. In some instances, the temperature detection is used 
to activate a high expansion foam system that helps control vaporization. 
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) systems are required to shut off operations in the 
event that certain specified fault conditions or equipment failures occur. They should be 
designed to prevent or limit significantly the amount of LNG and natural gas that could 
be released. The ESD system should be kept to fail to a safe condition. 
All LNG terminals should include a fire water system. The amount of water will 
be determined by the number of fire protection systems and demand for these systems.  
Fire protection systems for LNG facilities consist of water spray, high expansion foam, 
dry chemical, or a combination of these. Water spray is used to control radiant heat 
exposure on equipment and structures. LNG pool fires are neither controlled nor 
extinguished by water. High expansion foam can be used to control the vaporization rate 
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on the surface of an LNG spill. The foam works by warming the LNG vapors and 
reducing the fire thermal radiation back to the LNG pool, thereby reducing the LNG 
burning rate. High expansion foam is generally provided for impounding areas or where 
a LNG pool can form. Dry chemical extinguishing systems are used to extinguish an 
LNG fire. The dry chemical should be applied such that the surface is not agitated, 
which will allow additional vaporization. Dry chemical systems have been installed at 
unloading area, LNG pumps, boil-off compressors, and LNG vaporizers. 
LNG facility designs are required to maintain separation distances, named Safety 
Exclusion Zones, to separate land-based facilities from communities and other public 
areas. Federal regulations (49 CFR 193, [4]) have always required that LNG facilities are 
sited at a safe distance from adjacent industries, communities, and other public areas. 
The safe distances or exclusion zones are based on LNG vapor dispersion data, thermal 
radiation contours, and other considerations as specified in regulations.  
En Sup Yoon et al [8] addressed the LNG process as following simplified 
process diagram of the LNG terminal is shown in Figure 1.1. LNG is transferred from 
the tanker (ship) into the LNG storage tank driven by ship pumps. During unloading 
operations, boil-off gas is returned from the tanks to the ship by compressors, or pressure 
differential to balance the pressure between storage tanks and ship tanks. Generally, 
LNG is vaporized by using heat source such as natural gas, seawater or process water. 
The natural gas after vaporizing is sent out to the distribution pipelines through a 
metering station. 
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Figure 1.1  Process flow diagram of the LNG terminal [8] 
 
 
 They also suggested some recommendations for safety enhancement. The 
following recommendations may be cited for safety improvement methods for the LNG 
terminal of this research. Inert gas systems are useful for extinguishing fires and 
preventing explosions in enclosed spaces. Fixed inerting systems are recommended for 
handling flammable fluid in enclosed areas. It is imperative to train facility personnel in 
emergency response procedures and the utilization of emergency equipment. All project 
personnel will receive intensive training in emergency response strategies prior to 
assuming their duties. Training may include realistic simulations of emergency situations. 
Refresher courses as well as safety meetings can be held at regular intervals. In addition, 
written manuals outlining approved procedures in various emergency situations will be 
prepared and issued to all terminal personnel. 
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1.2.2. LOPA 
 
In the 1990s, companies and industry groups developed standards to design, 
build, and maintain Safety Instrumented System (SIS, [9]). A key input for the tools and 
techniques required to implement these standards was the required Probability of Failure 
on Demand (PFD) for each Safety Instrumented Function (SIF). Process Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) teams and project teams struggled to determine the required Safety 
Integrity Level (SIL) for the SIFs [10]. The concept of layers of protection and an 
approach to analyze the number of layers needed was first published by the Center for 
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), which is an AIChE (American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers) Industry Technology Alliance, in the 1993 book “Guidelines for Safe 
Automation of Chemical Processes”. Based on those concepts, several companies 
developed internal procedures for Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), and CCPS 
published “Layer of Protection Analysis-Simplified Process Risk Assessment” in 2001 
[11].  
According to Dowell [12], LOPA is an effective way to determine the required 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL, [13], [14]) for Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) based on 
the risk of the undesired event. Dowell extended the LOPA concepts to show the effect 
of inherently safer features. Inherently safer features in a process design can reduce the 
required SIL of the SIS, or can eliminate the need for the SIS, and then reduce cost of 
installation and maintenance. Dowell’s paper may be useful to find out the 
recommendations for safety improvement after LOPA application for LNG terminals. 
After LOPA application, it may be recommended to add additional IPLs in the 
plant in order to satisfy the risk criteria. However, CCPS [11] suggested that such 
additional barriers have disadvantages: 
• The barriers can be expensive to design, build, and maintain, and 
• The hazard is still present in the process, and failures of enough layers of 
protection can still result in an incident. 
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Therefore, it is desirable to reduce or eliminate hazards by applying inherently 
safer concepts to the process design and chemistry. In order to reduce risk, one can 
reduce the severity of the consequence, reduce the frequency of the consequence 
occurrence, and strengthen the layer of protection. 
The inherently safer design strategies of minimize, substrate, moderate, and 
simplify can be applied to reduce incidents. In order to reduce initiating cause frequency, 
following recommendations may be applied. Examples: 
• Reduce flange leaks by eliminating flanges 
• Eliminate pump seal leaks by eliminating the pump or replacing into non-seal 
pump (pump with high sealing capability) 
• Reduce operational errors by changing the design of the procedure and the 
equipment to make them error tolerant [15]. For example, if opening valves in a 
particular sequence is important, the valve operators can be keyed such that the 
valves can only be opened in the correct sequence [16]. 
For each layer of protection, it can be considered to make the layer inherently 
stronger, or less likely to fail. For example, a process design that sends a tank overflow 
back to the supply tank may be inherently safer than a high level alarm and sensor that 
operates a shut-off valve. The process should be designed to handle the maximum 
overflow and should not introduce any contamination into the supply tank. 
Another way to improve the protection layer is to reduce the time of operator 
response to an alarm. This alarm should be independent of the SIS and the BPCS (Basic 
Process Control System). This IPL can be improved by making the alarm clear, by 
making the response to the alarm quick and by training personnel in the correct 
procedures. Additionally, the sensor, logic solvers, and annunciators for operator 
response should be tested periodically. An SIS can be designed to minimize human error 
during operation and maintenance. An SIL can be upgraded to strengthen the SIS 
performance. 
The additional mitigation category of IPLs includes pressure relief systems, 
restricted access, explosion suppression systems, fire protection systems, flame arrestors, 
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etc. The relief valve that is piped to a high elevation may be safer for the operators than 
the relief valve that discharges near the workplace. Moreover, relief valves may also 
vent to catch tanks, scrubbers, and/or flares. For example, suppose a relief valve can be 
manually isolated from the process which is intended to protect. The relief valve may not 
prevent high pressure when it is needed because the manual isolation valve may be 
closed. An inherently safer design might eliminate isolation valves around the relief 
valve. Alternatively, a three-way valve might be installed that ensures full flow to both 
dual relief valves during the switching process. 
Dowell and Williams [17] detailed the concept of automatically generating 
LOPA scenarios from a process hazard analysis (PHA) conducted using the hazard and 
operability (HAZOP) methodology. This concept makes the process of going from PHA 
results to LOPA results a lot less time consuming. It avoids retyping and reduces the risk 
of overlooking scenarios. An approach to develop LOPA scenarios is to simply screen 
spreadsheets in the HAZOP methodology. Each consequence is ranked for its severity, 
and the associated causes for the consequence are placed into categories for their 
unmitigated frequencies, that is, the frequency without considering safeguards. The risk 
associated with a scenario – a cause and consequence pair – is estimated by the 
intersection of the consequence severity and the cause frequency on the risk matrix. 
Translation of HAZOP information into LOPA scenario is given graphically in Figure 
1.2. Note that not all information from the HAZOP is included in the LOPA. 
Consequences that do not meet the risk matrix criteria are omitted and very low 
frequency causes may be omitted because applying LOPA of some major incident 
scenarios is more time efficient and reasonable. Safeguards that do not meet the IPL 
criteria will not be considered as IPLs in the LOPA. Additional IPLs may be added or 
existing IPLs be strengthened for safer measures [12] as a result of the LOPA study. 
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Figure 1.2  Relationship between HAZOP and LOPA information [17] 
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Markowski and Mannan [18, 19] developed the Fuzzy Logic System (FLS) 
applicable in the framework of the Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) to reduce the 
uncertainty and imprecision of the result of LOPA. They developed the fuzzy LOPA 
model as shown in Figure 1.3. Markowski described LOPA as well as Fuzzy Logic 
System in his book, “Layer of Protection Analysis for the Process Industries [19].” 
Bayesian logic has also a similar function with that of Fuzzy logic. So Markowski’s 
paper may also provide some references to LOPA application of LNG terminals 
associated with Bayesian logic.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.3  Structure of fLOPA [18, 19] 
 
 
1.2.3. BAYESIAN LOGIC 
 
Named for Thomas Bayes, an English clergyman and mathematician, Bayesian 
logic is a branch of logic applied to decision making and inferential statistics that deals 
with probability inference: using the knowledge of prior events to predict future events. 
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Bayes' theorem provided, for the first time, a mathematical method that could be used to 
calculate, given occurrences in prior trials, the likelihood of a target occurrence in future 
trials. According to Bayesian logic, the only way to quantify a situation with an 
uncertain outcome is through determining its probability. Bayes' Theorem is a means of 
quantifying uncertainty. Based on probability theory, the theorem defines a rule for 
refining a hypothesis by factoring in additional evidence and background information, 
and results in a number representing the degree of probability ([20], [21]). Bayesian 
logic may be used to reduce the uncertainty and imprecision of failure data of IPLs with 
sparse failure data including both historical data and corporate memory. That is, the 
updated failure data from Bayesian logic may be more reliable than generic data or plant 
specific data because they can reflect both historical experiences from generic sources 
and plant specific experiences from plant data. 
Modarres [22] showed the Bayes’ theorem which follows directly from the 
concept of conditional probability in his book. The equation of Bayes’ theorem is 
)Pr(
Pr)Pr(
Pr
E
AEA
EA
⋅
=        (1.1) 
The generalized form of the above equation, which can be used for discrete 
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The right-hand side of generalized Bayes’ equation consists of Pr(Aj), which is 
called prior probability, and the rest term, which is called relative likelihood, which is 
based on evidential observations. EAjPr  is called the posterior probability given 
event E, which is updated probability of event Aj. Definitely, the more evidence is 
available, the further the posterior probability can be updated. For continuous variables, 
the form of the generalized Bayes’ equation is 
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Where h(λ) is continuous prior probability density function (pdf), and λtl  is 
the likelihood function based on sample data t, and then tf λ  is the posterior pdf of λ.  
That is, the fundamental relationship of Bayes’ theorem is 
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where marginal distribution acts as a normalizing constant. 
According to Sandia National Laboratories [23], Bayesian estimation can 
incorporate the degree of belief from generic data and information in the sampled data 
from plant specific data. The prior belief which is referred to as the prior distribution 
describes the state of knowledge about the parameter before getting the data sample. 
Bayesian estimation can be composed of two areas. The first area is to take advantage of 
available data to assign a subjective prior distribution from historical reliability data. The 
second area is to use specific data from specific plants or industries to update an existing 
prior distribution. 
Bayesian estimation can give the credible interval estimate of the parameter 
directly from the posterior distribution. In other words, the interpretation of 90% 
credible interval (a, b) of Bayesian posterior probability is that, with 90% subjective 
probability, the parameter belongs to the interval (a, b), given the prior and sampling 
distribution. 
Bayesian estimation includes following four steps. The first step is to identify the 
parameters to be estimated such as failure rate or probability. Second is to develop a 
prior distribution that properly shows the knowledge or degree of belief concerning the 
unknown reliability data. The third step is to collect the data sample from a specific plant 
or industry as a likelihood function. The final step is to combine the prior distribution 
with the sampled data using Bayes’ theorem to make the desired updated posterior 
distribution. 
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Typically, the selection of prior distribution may be seen to be a little subjective. 
The choice of a prior distribution should be evaluated to determine the sensitivity to 
failure rates. Thus, conjugate prior is very useful to choose the prior distribution more 
objectively or technically. Conjugate prior distribution can make a posterior distribution 
that is a member of the same family of distributions. Therefore, the conjugate prior 
distribution is very easy to compute the posterior parameters from prior distribution. The 
beta distribution is the conjugate prior distribution for probability of failure of a device 
in a binomial sample situation as a likelihood function. That is, beta distribution can be a 
prior distribution of a probability of failure on demand (PFD), which is one of the 
demand-related failures, with a binomial likelihood function, and then it will produce 
beta posterior distribution. For the failure frequency or rate which is one of the time-
related failures, the gamma distribution is the conjugate prior distribution with either 
Poisson or exponential data and then it will make a gamma distribution of posterior data. 
 When there is very little prior information of a parameter, non-informative prior, 
which can be a part of uniform distribution, may be used as a prior distribution. For 
example, if failure rates of some equipment are not available in the generic historical 
sources, the non-informative prior distribution may be used to get posterior data. One of 
the commonly used non-informative prior distributions is the Jeffreys prior distribution 
in probability risk analysis (PRA). According to Sandia National Laboratories [23], 
Jeffreys’ method is to transform the model into a parameterization in terms of a location 
parameter, which slides the distribution sideways without changing its shape. And then 
the method uses the uniform distribution as the non-informative prior for the location 
parameter. 
 Table 1.3 shows the difference between the classical and Bayesian estimation 
with some advantages and disadvantages. 
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Table 1.3  Comparison of classical and Bayesian estimation [22] 
 
Class Classical estimation Bayesian estimation 
Advan-
tages 
 Results depend only on the 
data 
 With large quantity of data, 
produce good estimation 
 Easier to understand and use 
 Provides a logical approach to estimation. 
Measure uncertainty about parameters 
using probabilities. With accurate prior 
distribution, good parameter estimates. 
 Provides a formal method of introducing 
prior information and knowledge into the 
analysis. Useful when sample data are 
scarce, as in the case of rare events. 
Permits the use of various types of relevant 
generic data. 
 Interprets uncertainty about a parameter 
using a subjective probability interval. 
 Reasoning process is straightforward 
 Applicable to a larger class of situations 
likely to be encountered in risk 
assessment. 
Dis-
advan-
tages 
 A confidence interval 
cannot be directly 
interpreted 
 Relevant information may 
exist outside the sample data 
 The available data are often 
a mix of various data 
sources and types. 
 A suitable prior distribution must be 
identified and justified subjectively 
 Sensitive to the choice of a prior 
distribution 
 More effort to understand and use 
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 Shafaghi [24] showed how to update the equipment failure data using Bayesian 
estimation in the 2006 MKOPSC (Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center) 
Symposium. In his paper, he provided the concept of Bayesian statistics, how to choose 
prior distribution and likelihood function, and a case study related to failure rates of 
pressure vessels. In order to get the posterior failure rates, he used a gamma distribution 
as a conjugate prior and a Poisson distribution as a likelihood function, and this resulted 
in the posterior gamma distribution. His method may be used to find out the posterior 
failure rates of initiating events in LOPA methodology. However, the way to compute 
the posterior PFDs was not given in his paper. 
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2. METHODOLOGY DESCRIPTION 
 
Section 2 shows the brief description of methods which will be used in this 
research. Some contents may be similar to the literature review of Section 1 and 
methodology development of Section 3. However, the purpose of this Section is to 
provide brief ideas about several methods related to the research and help to understand 
this research. Section 3 will focus on the development of Bayesian-LOPA methodology. 
Additionally, the detail procedures and several diagrams for the method will be provided 
and explained in Section 3. 
 
2.1. HAZOP 
 
HAZOP study, Hazard and Operability study, is one of the procedures to identify 
hazards in chemical process facilities. The procedure is also one of the qualitative risk 
assessments. HAZOP study is very effective and systematic method to find out hazards 
as opposed to other methods such as FMEA, What-If, and checklists because it uses the 
systematic guide words for the process parameters and well-organized spreadsheets. 
Thus it is well accepted in the industries. For the HAZOP study, it is necessary to get 
detail process information including process flow diagram, piping and instrumentation 
diagram (P&ID), equipment specifications, process conditions, MSDS and properties of 
chemicals, and materials of construction.  
The HAZOP study requires a team which consists of people who have experiences 
of a plant, technical knowledge, and safety expertise. The team may be composed of a 
HAZOP leader who serves as the committee chair, a scriber who is in charge of 
recording the results, process engineers, safety engineers, operators, external consultants, 
and so on. 
Crowl [25] showed HAZOP procedures to complete an analysis: 
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1) Start with the flow sheet such as process flow diagram. Break the process flow 
diagram into several process units such as reactor units, storage tank units, etc. 
The units can be a number of nodes. Select a unit for study. 
2) Choose a study node such as vessels, reactors, pipelines, etc. 
3) Describe the design intent of the study node. 
4) Select a process parameter among following parameters ; level, temperature, 
flow, pressure, concentration, pH, viscosity, state (solid, liquid, or gas), reaction, 
volume, component, start, stop, stability, power, inert, agitation. 
5) Apply every guide word to a process parameter. Table 2.1 shows several guide 
words and their meanings. Additionally, Table 2.2 provides valid guide words for 
process parameters. 
6) If the deviation, which is the guide words of a parameter, is applicable, find out 
possible causes and consequences, and note any protection systems or safeguards 
against the incident cases. 
7) Recommend some actions to mitigate the consequences or reduce the frequencies 
of the incident (if any). 
8) Record all information and documentation. 
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Table 2.1  Guide words of HAZOP study [25] 
 
Guide words Meaning Comments 
NO, NOT, NONE The complete negation of 
the intention 
No part of the design intention is 
achieved, but nothing else happens 
MORE, HIGHER, 
GREATER 
Quantitative increase Applies to quantities such as pressure 
and flow rate and to activities such as 
reaction and heating 
LESS, LOWER Quantitative decrease Applies to quantities such as pressure 
and flow rate and to activities such as 
reaction and heating 
AS WELL AS Qualitative increase All the design and operating intentions 
are accomplished with some additional 
activities such as contamination of 
process streams 
PART OF Qualitative decrease Only some of the design intentions are 
accomplished, some are not. 
REVERSE The logical opposite of Most applicable to activities such as 
flow or chemical reaction.  
OTHER THAN Complete substitution No part of original intention is 
accomplished – the original design 
intention is replaced by something else. 
 
 
Table 2.2 shows the valid guide words of process parameters for process 
pipelines, and valid guide words for process vessels are shown in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.2  Valid guide words for process pipelines [25] 
 
Process 
parameters 
No, 
not, 
none 
More, 
higher, 
greater 
Less, 
lower 
As 
well 
as 
Part 
of 
Reverse 
Other 
than 
Flow ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Temperature  ○ ○     
Pressure  ○ ○ ○    
Concentration ○ ○ ○ ○ ○  ○ 
pH  ○ ○     
Viscosity  ○ ○     
State    ○   ○ 
 
 
Table 2.3  Valid guide words for process vessels [25] 
 
Process 
parameters 
No, 
not, 
none 
More, 
higher, 
greater 
Less, 
lower 
As 
well 
as 
Part 
of 
Reverse 
Other 
than 
Level ○ ○ ○ ○ ○  ○ 
Temperature  ○ ○     
Pressure  ○ ○ ○    
Concentration ○ ○ ○ ○ ○  ○ 
pH  ○ ○     
Viscosity  ○ ○     
Agitation ○ ○ ○  ○ ○  
Volume ○ ○ ○ ○ ○   
Reaction ○ ○ ○    ○ 
State    ○   ○ 
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 Sometimes it is hard to apply some guide words such as AS WELL AS, PART 
OF, and OTHER THAN. The guide word AS WELL AS is that something else happens 
additionally together with the design intention. For example, this may be boiling of a 
liquid or transfer of some additional component unexpectedly. In the case of PART OF, 
examples may be that some of the components are missing or some part of streams has 
gone to somewhere. OTHER THAN means that a chemical may be substituted for the 
unexpected material and is transferred somewhere else. 
Table 2.4 presents a typical form of HAZOP spreadsheets. Several commercial 
HAZOP programs are available now, and also HAZOP can be done easily in the general 
spreadsheet software.  
 
Table 2.4   Typical HAZOP form 
 
Study node name (or number) : 
Process 
parameters 
Deviations 
(guide words) 
Possible causes 
Possible 
consequences 
Action required 
     
     
     
 
The methodology of HAZOP can be easily understood and quite systematic to 
apply. However, the successful results of HAZOP may be significantly dependent on the 
experiences and expertise of interested facilities of a HAZOP team and the quality of 
gathered information is also very important to the success. Thus, setting up a quality 
HAZOP team and gathering required all information must not be disregarded for 
HAZOP study. 
For LOPA applications, HAZOP results are required to make possible incident 
scenarios combined with the causes and consequences. If HAZOP results which are 
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previously done by some teams and allowed to use for LOPA application are available, 
they may be used directly for LOPA analysis so that analysts can save their time and/or 
money. Otherwise, conducting HAZOP study by ourselves is one of the prerequisites for 
LOPA. 
 
2.2. LOPA 
 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is one of the risk assessment methodologies. 
It is called semi-quantitative risk assessment because it can provide quantified results of 
frequency even though it can present qualitative results of consequence or severity. 
LOPA is a simplified form of risk assessment which uses initiating event frequency, 
consequence severity, and the probability of failure on demand (PFD) of independent 
protection layers (IPLs) to estimate the risk of a possible incident scenario. Typically, 
LOPA builds on the information developed during process hazard analysis (PHA) such 
as HAZOP, FMEA, Check-list and What-if methods. The results of PHA can be used to 
make possible incident scenarios by combination of causes and consequences for LOPA 
applications.  
The purpose of LOPA is to estimate the risk level of interested facilities and to 
make risk decisions compared to tolerable risk criteria. The purpose can be to determine 
whether the facilities have sufficient layers of protections against an incident scenario or 
not. LOPA may be used to make risk ranking among incident scenarios and then give 
some maintenance or safety measure priorities to some equipments which have higher 
risks than others. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates many types of protective layers. Applying to how many layers 
of protection is dependent on the process complexity and potential severity of an 
incident scenario. Since no layer is perfectly effective, sufficient layers of protection 
should be provided to prevent possible incidents or mitigate consequences. These 
protective safeguards can be one of the IPLs. However, not all safeguards are IPLs, but 
  
 
30 
all IPLs are safeguards. According to CCPS [11], in order to be considered as an IPL in a 
LOPA application, these protective layers should meet the following three IPL rules. 
 
1) Effective in preventing the consequence when it functions as designed. 
2) Independent of the initiating events and the components of any other IPLs 
already credited for the same scenario 
3) Auditable, that is, the assumed effectiveness in terms of consequence 
prevention and PFD should be able to be validated by documentation, 
review, testing, and so on. 
 
E-1
V-2
Process 
Equipment
Basic process control 
systems
Alarms and human 
intervention
Safety instrumented 
function (SIF)
Physical protection
(relief valve)
Post-release physical 
protection (dike)
 
 
Figure 2.1  Protective layers against an incident scenario 
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 An incident scenario can be made with a cause-consequence pair. The LOPA 
scenario represents one path which is worst case through an event tree. CCPS [11] shows 
an event tree for an initiating event in Figure 2.2. In this case, three IPLs are provided 
against the incident scenario. Once an initiating event occurred, every IPL should 
prevent the undesirable consequence. However, the effectiveness of each IPL is not 
perfect, thus all IPLs may have some probabilities of failure on demand. If one of the 
IPLs succeeds to work the designed function, the safe outcome or undesired but tolerable 
outcome can be obtained. The undesired but tolerable outcome is called mitigated 
consequence. However, if all IPLs fail to stop the incident and work properly, 
consequences exceeding tolerable criteria may be occurred as a bold line is shown in 
Figure 2.2. The risk of an incident scenario can be computed by multiplying the 
frequency of an initiating event and all PFDs of IPLs. This calculated frequency is called 
mitigated frequency. If the frequency is not acceptable compared to tolerable risk criteria, 
additional IPLs, improving SIFs or other safety measures should be considered to reduce 
the risk. As shown in Figure 2.2, the thickness of arrow represents frequency of the 
consequence. As the arrow pass through IPLs, the thickness grow thinner. Thus, this 
means that the more IPLs, the less frequency of consequence. However, practically, 
adding IPLs results in high cost, so practical approach is necessary to determine the 
sufficiency of IPLs by comparing to tolerable risk criteria which may be set up by 
organizations or by countries. 
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Figure 2.2  An event tree of an incident scenario in LOPA [11] 
 
 
 LOPA is typically used after a PHA such as HAZOP and FMEA to estimate and 
quantify the potential risks. According to CCPS [11], LOPA can also be applied when 
hazard analysis team 
▫ Believes that a scenario is too complicated to make a good risk judgment using 
qualitative method, or 
▫ The consequences are too severe to rely on qualitative risk judgment. 
LOPA can also be used to screen the incident scenarios prior to quantitative risk 
assessment (Chemical process quantitative risk assessment, CPQRA) method. CPQRA is 
more rigorous than LOPA, and it is a very detailed method to determine the risks which 
may be composed of consequence analysis (CA) for the physical effects and frequency 
analysis (FA) for the probability (or frequency) of incident scenarios. The results of 
CPQRA may be compared to risk criteria such as individual risk (e.g. FAR; Fatal 
PFD1 =p1 
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tolerable outcome 
Undesired but 
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Accident Rate) or societal risk (e.g. f-N curve) to determine the risk. CPQRA can make 
very detailed and reasonable risk calculation, however, it demands a lot of time, man-
hours and detailed information. Thus, typically CPQRA may be applied to the highly 
dangerous incident scenarios screened by LOPA or PHA. CCPS [11] provided the 
spectrum among various risk assessment methods included LOPA and CPQRA as shown 
in Figure 2.3. Figure 2.3 can show easily the relationship between LOPA and CPQRA, 
and can be used to determine when we may use LOPA or CPQRA. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Relationship between LOPA and CPQRA [11] 
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LOPA can be done with several steps. CCPS [11] shows the LOPA steps with a 
diagram as shown in Figure 2.4. Each incident case should be done through all steps for 
LOPA applications. That is, LOPA can be applied to a scenario at a time. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4  LOPA steps [11] 
 
Step 1: Identify the consequence to screen the scenarios. LOPA can be applied to 
all incident scenarios found by PHA. However, it is not practical, so some scenarios 
which may result in high magnitude of severity can be selected to apply LOPA. This 
screening tool may be based on consequences identified during PHA such as HAZOP 
study. 
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Step 2: Pick an incident scenario. The scenario can be made with a single cause-
consequence pair in the PHA results.  
Step 3: Identify the initiating event of the scenario and obtain the frequency of 
the initiating event. The initiating event which may be found in causes of PHA results 
should result in the consequence. The initiating event frequency from the interested 
facility, which is called plant specific data, is most preferable, but generally it is not 
easily obtained. Even though it is available, if it is not long-term accumulated data, it 
may have some statistical shaky grounds because of short-term history. A second option 
is to get the frequency data from the generic data which is long-term and historical based 
data from similar industries such as OREDA and CCPS database. They are very 
statistically reliable, but they may not have the same environments with the interested 
facility. A third option is to update the frequency data from both generic data and plant 
specific data by using Bayesian logic. These updated data can reflect long-term 
statistical grounds as well as the specific conditions in the interested facilities. Detail 
information will be addressed in Section 3. 
Step 4: Identify the IPLs and obtain PFD of each IPL. This is the very important 
step for LOPA application because the success of LOPA application is highly dependent 
on this step. Existing safeguards should be screened to be an IPL with IPL rules; 
independence, effectiveness and auditability. After identifying the IPLs, the PFD of each 
IPL should be estimated from the obtained information as such initiating event 
frequency in step 3. 
Step 5: Estimate the risk by the following mathematical calculation combining 
the initiating event frequency and PFDs of IPLs.  
  
iJii
I
i
c
i
J
j
ji
I
i
c
i
PFDPFDPFDff
PFDff
××××=
×= ∏
=
....21
1      (2.1) 
Where fic = frequency for consequence C for initiating event i 
   fiI = initiating event frequency for initiating event i 
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PFDij = Probability of failure on demand of the jth IPL that 
protects against consequence C for initiating event i. 
 
Step 6: Make risk decisions concerning about the scenario. The estimated risk 
values can be compared to the tolerable risk criteria given by companies, industries, or 
government. CCPS [11] presents risk criteria of two cases. One is the case with 
considering human harm in the incident scenario. Maximum tolerable risk criteria is less 
than year/101 5−×  and action required criteria is less than year/101 4−× . The other case 
is without considering human harm, that is, only consider consequences such as release, 
fire or explosion. Maximum tolerable risk criteria is less than year/101 5−×  and action 
required criteria is less than year/101 3−× . LOPA analysts may use these criteria given 
by CCPS. 
CCPS [11] provides the example LOPA sheet as shown Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5  Example of LOPA spreadsheet [11] 
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2.3. BAYESIAN LOGIC 
 
According to Wan [26], Bayesian estimation is based on the subjective definition 
of probability as degree of belief and on Bayes’ theorem, and it is the basic tool for 
assigning probabilities to hypothesize combining a prior judgment and experimental 
information. Bayesian logic may be used to reduce the uncertainty and imprecision of 
failure data of IPLs with sparse failure data including both historical data and corporate 
memory. That is, the updated failure data from Bayesian logic may be more reliable than 
generic data or plant specific data because they can reflect both historical experiences 
from generic sources and plant specific experiences from plant data. 
Modarres [22] showed the Bayes’ theorem which follows directly from the 
concept of conditional probability in his book. The equation of Bayes’ theorem is 
)Pr(
Pr)Pr(
Pr
E
AEA
EA
⋅
=         (2.2) 
The generalized form of the above equation, which can be used for discrete 
variables, is  
∑
=
⋅
⋅
=
n
i
AiEAi
AjEAj
EAj
1
Pr)Pr(
Pr)Pr(
Pr       (2.3) 
The right-hand side of generalized Bayes’ equation consists of Pr(Aj), which is 
called prior probability, and the rest term, which is called relative likelihood, which is 
based on evidential observations. EAjPr  is called the posterior probability given 
event E, which is updated probability of event Aj. The above equation means that the 
probability data can be updated with the prior probability and the relative likelihood 
based on some evidences. Definitely, the more evidence is available, the further the 
posterior probability can be updated. For continuous variables, the form of the 
generalized Bayes’ equation is 
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Where h(λ) is continuous prior probability density function (pdf), and λtl  is 
the likelihood function based on sample data t, and then tf λ  is the posterior pdf of λ.  
That is, the fundamental relationship of Bayes’ theorem is 
ondistributiinalm
likelihoodondistributiprior
ondistributiposterior
arg
×
=    (2.5) 
where marginal distribution acts as a normalizing constant. 
According to Sandia National Laboratories [23], Bayesian estimation can 
incorporate the degree of belief from generic data and information in the sampled data 
from plant specific data. The prior belief, referred to as the prior distribution, describes 
the state of knowledge about the parameter before getting the data sample. Bayesian 
estimation can be composed of two areas. The first area is to take advantage of available 
data to assign a subjective prior distribution from historical reliability data. The second 
area is to use additional or specific data from specific plants or industries to update an 
existing prior distribution. 
Bayesian estimation can give the credible interval estimates of the parameter 
directly from the posterior distribution. That is, the interpretation of 90% credible 
interval (a, b) of Bayesian posterior probability is that, with 90% subjective probability, 
the parameter belongs to the interval (a, b), given the prior and sampling distribution. 
Bayesian estimation includes following four steps: 
 First step: identify the parameters to be estimated such as failure rate or 
probability.  
 Second step: develop a prior distribution that properly shows the knowledge or 
degree of belief concerning the unknown reliability data.  
 Third step: collect the data sample from a specific plant or industry as a 
likelihood function.  
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 Fourth step: combine the prior distribution with the sampled data using Bayes’ 
theorem to make the desired updated posterior distribution. 
 
Typically, the selection of prior distribution may be seen to be a little subjective. 
The choice of a prior distribution should be evaluated to determine the sensitivity to 
failure rates. Thus, conjugate prior is very useful to choose the prior distribution more 
objectively or technically. Conjugate prior distribution can make a posterior distribution 
that is a member of the same family of distributions. Therefore, the conjugate prior 
distribution is very easy to compute the posterior parameters from prior distribution. The 
beta distribution is the conjugate prior distribution for probability of failure of a device 
in a binomial sample situation as a likelihood function. That is, beta distribution can be a 
prior distribution of PFD, which is one of the demand-related failures, with a binomial 
likelihood function, and then it will produce beta posterior distribution. For the failure 
frequency or rate, which is one of the time-related failures, the gamma distribution is the 
conjugate prior distribution with either Poisson or exponential data and then it will make 
a gamma distribution of posterior data. Table 2.5 summarizes conjugate relationships of 
frequencies of initiating events and PFDs of IPLs respectively. 
 
 
Table 2.5   Summarized conjugate relationships 
 
Class. Prior distribution Likelihood function Posterior distribution 
Frequency of 
initiating event 
Gamma Poisson Gamma 
PFD of IPL Beta Binomial Beta 
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In order to apply Bayesian logic to LOPA, the frequency of an initiating event 
and the PFD of IPLs should be obtained respectively. Detail information about how to 
get posterior values with conjugation relationships will be addressed in Section 3. 
 
2.3.1. FREQUENCY OF AN INITIATING EVENT 
 
For the frequency of an initiating event, analyst should know the maximum 
likelihood estimation and Bayesian estimation.  
First, the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE), which is called also point 
estimate, is the most commonly used frequentist estimate. MLE is the value of λ that 
maximizes the likelihood or frequency, where λ can be the frequency of an initiating 
event. MLE of λ is 
tx /=
∧
λ          (2.6) 
where x is the observed number of failures and t is the observed time period. 
This equation is very simple and natural. The hat notation indicate that the MLE 
is an estimate calculated from the data unknown λ. 
 Second, in order to update the data, the Bayesian estimation can be used. 
Bayesian estimation consists of prior distribution which is the prior belief about λ and 
likelihood function which can be made from the collected data. Likelihood function is 
given by Equation 2.7 for initiating events. 
!
)()Pr(
x
te
xX
xt λλ−
==        (2.7) 
This equation is the formula for the Poisson distribution, and the probability of x 
initiating events in time t for any particular number x. Posterior distribution is made by 
combining the prior distribution and likelihood function through Bayes’ theorem. 
Equation 2.5 can be modified as such 
)()()( λλλ priorpost flikelihoodf ×∝       (2.8) 
where the symbol ∞ denotes “is proportional to”. 
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 Figure 2.6 shows the example graphs of prior distribution and posterior 
distributions corresponding to three hypothetical data sets. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6  Example of prior distribution and posterior distributions [23] 
 
Corresponding to Figures 2.6, the posterior distribution looks similar to the prior 
for a small data set. Therefore, as the data set becomes larger, following summary can be 
possible: 
 the posterior distribution set apart more and more from the prior distribution, 
since the data contribute the dominant information, 
 the posterior distribution becomes more concentrated, meaning the better 
accuracy, less uncertainty, and 
 the posterior distribution becomes approximately centered around the MLE. 
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As shown in Table 2.6, the conjugate family of Poisson data is the family of 
gamma distributions. For Bayesian estimation, the equation 2.9 which is gamma 
distributions with two parameterizations is more convenient one. 
λβα
α
λ
α
βλ −−
Γ
= ef 1)()(         (2.9) 
Where, λ has units of 1/time and β has units of time, thus the product λβ is 
unitless. The parameter β is kind of scale parameter which corresponds to the scale of λ. 
The other parameter α is shape parameter which is unitless and corresponds to the 
distribution shape of λ. In this parameterization, the mean of gamma distribution, E(λ) is 
α/β and the variance, var(λ) is α/β2. Equation 2.9 can be rewritten after stripping of all 
the normalizing constants as such 
λβαλλ −−∝ ef 1)(         (2.10) 
For Bayesian estimation, equation 2.7, 2.8 and 2.10 can be combined each other, 
and then posterior distribution is  
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Equation 2.11 shows the posterior distribution is also a gamma distribution from 
the gamma prior. This is the meaning of conjugate. The updated formula in the posterior 
gamma distribution is 
priorpostpriorpost tx ββαα +=+= ,       (2.12) 
Therefore, the posterior mean is αpost/βpost and the variance, var(λ) is αpost/βpost2. 
That is, the value of posterior mean can be calculated with prior parameters (αprior, βprior) 
like equation 2.13. 
prior
prior
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post
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β
α
µ
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+
==        (2.13) 
In order to make sure the uncertainty, the credible interval of the posterior 
distribution may be calculated. The equation of (100p)th percentile is  
postpostpp βαχλ 2/)2(2=        (2.14) 
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Where )2(2 postp αχ  is the pth quantile of a chi-squared distribution with postα2  
degrees of freedom. The values of a chi-squared distribution can be easily obtained in 
the statistics or reliability engineering literatures. 
 When there is very little prior information of a parameter, non-informative prior 
which can be a part of uniform distribution may be used as a prior distribution. For 
example, if failure rates of some equipment are not available in the generic historical 
sources, the non-informative prior distribution may be used to get posterior data. One of 
the commonly used non-informative prior distributions is the Jeffreys prior distribution 
in probability risk analysis (PRA). According to Sandia National Laboratories [23], 
Jeffreys’ method is to transform the model into a parameterization in terms of a location 
parameter, which slides the distribution sideways without changing its shape. And then 
the method uses the uniform distribution as the non-informative prior for the location 
parameter. With Poisson data as a likelihood function, the Jeffreys non-informative prior 
distribution can be a gamma distribution which shape parameter, α, is equal to ½ and 
scale parameter, β, is equal to zero. If the normalizing constant in equation 2.9 is ignored, 
a function that is proportional to 2/1λ  can be yielded and it is shown in Figure 2.7. As 
shown in Figure 2.7, the distribution might be considered as a uniform distribution. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7  Jeffreys non-informative prior distribution for an initiating event [23] 
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Corresponding to equation 2.12, formal application of the updated formulas for 
Jeffreys non-informative prior is  
tx postpost =+= βα ,5.0        (2.15) 
Thus, posterior mean of Jeffreys prior is 
t
x
post
post
post
5.0+
== β
α
µ        (2.16) 
And, if equation 2.15 is put into equation 2.14, the equation of (100p)th 
percentile is  
txpp 2/)12(2 += χλ         (2.17) 
 
2.3.2. PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ON DEMANDS (PFD) OF IPLs 
 
For the probability of failure on demands of IPLs, analysts should know the 
maximum likelihood estimation and Bayesian estimation.  
First, the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE), which is called point estimate, is 
the most commonly used frequentist estimate. MLE is the value of p that maximizes the 
likelihood or probability, where p can be the probability of failure on demand of an IPL. 
MLE of p is 
nxp /=
∧
         (2.18) 
where x is the observed number of failures and n is the observed number of 
demands. 
 Second, in order to update the data, the Bayesian estimation can be used. 
Bayesian estimation consists of prior distribution which is the prior belief about p and 
likelihood function which can be made from the collected data. Likelihood function is 
given by equation 2.19 for PFD. 
xnx pp
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Where the binomial coefficient is defined as 
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        (2.20) 
This equation is the formula for the Binomial distribution, and the PFD, p, 
consists of x failures in n demands. Posterior distribution is made by combining the prior 
distribution and likelihood function through Bayes’ theorem.  
As shown in Table 2.6, the conjugate family of Binomial data is the family of 
beta distributions. For Bayesian estimation, the equation 2.21 which is beta distributions 
with two parameterizations is more convenient one. 
11 )1()()(
)()( −− −
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=
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βα pppf       (2.21) 
The shape of beta distribution is dependent on the size of the two parameters, α 
and β. In this parameterization, the mean of beta distribution and the variance are 
βα
αµ
+
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Equation 2.21 can be rewritten after stripping of all the normalizing constants as 
such 
11 )1()( −− −∝ βα pppf        (2.24) 
And, equation 2.5 can be modified as such 
)(Pr)( pfpxXpf priorpost =∝       (2.25) 
Therefore, equation 2.24 and equation 2.19 can be combined as 
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Equation 2.26 shows the posterior distribution is also beta distribution from the 
beta prior with a binomial likelihood function. The updated formula in the posterior beta 
distribution is 
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priorpostpriorpost xnx ββαα +−=+= )(,      (2.27) 
Therefore, the value of the posterior mean and variance can be calculated as such 
equation 2.22 and 2.23. That is, the value of posterior mean can be calculated with prior 
parameters (αprior, βprior) as such equation 2.13. 
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In order to make sure the uncertainty, the credible interval of the posterior 
distribution may be calculated. The equation of (100q)th percentile is  
))2(2/()2( 22 postqpostpostqqp αχβαχ +=      (2.29) 
Where )2(2 postq αχ  is the qth quantile of a chi-squared distribution with postα2  
degrees of freedom. In case of beta distribution (α, β) with β>>α, the qth quantile can be 
approximated by chi-squared distribution as shown in equation 2.29. In this research, the 
chi-squared distribution percentiles of equation 2.29 may be used to obtain credible 
interval of a beta distribution instead of the beta distribution percentiles since every 
posterior β parameter is much larger than α parameter as shown in Appendix C. 
 As such the case of the frequency of initiating event, when there is very little 
prior information of a parameter, Jeffreys non-informative prior may be used as a prior 
distribution. With Binomial data as a likelihood function, the Jeffreys non-informative 
prior distribution can be a beta distribution which both parameter α and β are equal to ½. 
If the normalizing constant in equation 2.21 is ignored, a function that is proportional to 
2/12/1 )1( −− − pp  can be yielded and it is shown in Figure 2.8. As shown in Figure 2.8, the 
distribution might be considered as a uniform distribution. 
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Figure 2.8  Jeffreys non-informative prior distribution for PFD [23] 
 
 
Corresponding to equation 2.27, formal application of the updated formulas for 
Jeffreys non-informative prior is  
5.0,5.0 +−=+= xnx postpost βα       (2.30) 
Thus, posterior mean of Jeffreys prior is 
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Bayesian credible interval can be calculated as such equation 2.29.  
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3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAYESIAN-LOPA METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of the section is to show how to combine Bayesian logic and LOPA 
method and how to develop the Bayesian-LOPA methodology. Additionally, this section 
demonstrates how to convert the prior information into posterior data with likelihood 
data. This section is based on the method description of Section 2 as well as the literature 
review of Section 1, so some contents may be similar. 
 
3.1. OVERALL RESEARCH FLOW 
 
Bayesian-LOPA methodology, which is a new terminology developed in this 
research, is the advanced LOPA method combined with Bayesian estimation. The 
developed methodology may give more statistically reliable or concrete results of risk in 
a LNG facility than the normal LOPA methods. LNG industry has been keeping good 
safety records since it had been introduced in the industry. However, the operational 
history of the LNG industry is not enough to make sure the statistical stability of failure 
data as opposed to other industries such as refineries or petrochemical industries. That is, 
the failure data in the LNG facilities has statistically shaky grounds due to short-term 
based operational time and the number of demands. Therefore, in order to improve the 
reliability data in LNG industry, Bayesian estimation which can update plant specific 
data from LNG facilities with the generic data which have long-term historical 
experience can be one of the best progressions for risk assessments. Figure 3.1 shows the 
flow diagram of this research, and it also shows the every step for Bayesian-LOPA 
methodology. The Bayesian-LOPA methods can be applied to other industries which 
may have some uncertainties about the statistical reliability of failure data in risk 
assessments due to insufficient failure samples or shot-term operational time, e.g. 
aerospace industries. 
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Figure 3.1  The flow diagram of this research 
 
LOPA is the method of simplified process risk assessment which is typically 
applied after a process hazard analysis such as HAZOP study. For LOPA applications, 
the results of PHA are necessary to develop incident scenarios in the interested facilities 
such as a LNG importation terminal. HAZOP study is one of the most reliable 
qualitative hazard identification methods. Thus, HAZOP method will be used to identify 
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the incident scenarios in a LNG importation terminal. For HAZOP study, it is necessary 
to obtain the process information about a LNG terminal. This information may include 
process flow diagram, piping and instrument diagram (P&ID), and process data. 
Typically, it is very hard to obtain these kinds of process information. Even if the 
information is available, usually it is impossible to open to the public due to some 
copyright issues. Thus, in this research, generalized and simplified process flow 
diagrams and P&IDs were used. However, they still include the basic design concept and 
minimum specification adopted from the industrial standards such as NFPA 59A [6] and 
EN 1473 [1] of a LNG terminal. 
After getting the process information, a HAZOP team should be required to do 
HAZOP study. A HAZOP team was composed of a professor, 2 post doctors, and 7 
graduate students. The HAZOP study was done by the team following the methodology 
mentioned in Section 2.1. The incident scenarios found in HAZOP study will be 
estimated according to severity by a category method. The category method is the 
qualitative way to classify the consequences with engineering expert judgments. This 
category may be decided by the expected amount of release, the risk level of possible 
consequences (material loss, fire, explosion, or toxic effects). The category method will 
screen the possible incident scenarios with respect to the severity of consequences, and 
only the screened risky scenarios which may result in fatalities or large property damage 
will be applied to Bayesian-LOPA methodology. 
The next step is to develop the possible incident scenarios based on the HAZOP 
results. The incident cases screened by the severity of consequence can be made to 
incident scenarios combining the causes and consequences in HAZOP study. Typically, 
this process can be quite easily done if the PHA results are available previously. 
Causes found in HAZOP results may be initiating events of incident scenarios. 
After identifying an initiating event of a scenario, the frequency of the initiating event 
should be obtained for a LOPA application. There are three categories of data sources 
for initiating events. The first one is the generic data which are historical data from the 
same or similar industries such as refineries or petrochemical industries have long-term 
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operational time and also sufficient population of sampling data enough to stabilize the 
statistical view of failure data. However, it cannot reflect the characteristics and 
conditions of the plant that the equipment is operated under. Second is the plant specific 
data which can be obtained from LNG facilities can reflect the exact circumstances that 
the equipment is used under. However, LNG industry has not quite long enough history 
in gathering failure data and operational time rather than refineries and petrochemical 
industries. Thus, they are very hard to obtain due to confidential issues among industries 
and are very sparse due to a short-term operational time and history. Moreover, they may 
have statistically weak grounds due to a short duration or limited population of data 
collection. Therefore, one of the best options for high reliable risk assessments is to use 
the Bayesian engine (or estimation) which can be third category of data sources. 
Bayesian estimation can make the failure data updated with prior information from 
generic data and plant specific data from LNG industry. That is, the updated posterior 
data will reflect both the long-term operational history from generic data and the specific 
environments which the equipment (or facility) is operating under. Thus, Bayesian 
engine will be used to find out the frequencies of initiating events. The mathematical 
formulas and calculation diagram are addressed in Section 3.3. 
After getting the frequency data of an initiating event, it is necessary to identify 
Independent Protection Layers (IPLs). The IPL can be found and chosen in the list of 
safeguards of every incident case in HAZOP results. However, even though all IPLs can 
be safeguards, not all safeguards are IPLs because IPLs should meet the three 
requirements: independence, effectiveness, and auditability. Thus, very careful 
consideration should be taken to choose a safeguard as an IPL. Detail information of IPL 
is addressed in Section 2.2. Now, the probability of failure on demand (PFD) of each 
IPL should be obtained. Generally, this procedure is very similar to the Bayesian 
estimation of the frequency of initiating events. However, there are a few differences in 
the detailed mathematical calculations and distributions. The differences are addressed in 
the Sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
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The next step is to determine the frequency of an incident scenario. This step is 
very straightforward using spreadsheet programs or manual calculations. In this research, 
Microsoft EXCEL software is used. 
The last step is to make risk decisions by comparing an obtained frequency to 
tolerable risk criteria. These risk criteria may be given by companies, industries, or 
government. Two risk criteria presented by CCPS [11] are used in this research. One is 
the case with considering human harm in the incident scenario. In the case, maximum 
tolerable risk criteria is less than year/101 5−×  and action required criteria is less than 
year/101 3−× . The other is case without considering human harm, that is, only consider 
consequences such as release, fire or explosion. Maximum tolerable risk criteria is less 
than year/101 5−×  and action required criteria is less than year/101 4−× . If the 
estimated frequency cannot meet the tolerance criteria, some recommendations which 
may include additional IPLs or more frequent proof tests should be given to reduce the 
incident frequency or mitigate the severity of consequence. The procedure of 
recommendations will be treated in each incident case. 
As shown in Figure 3.1, these steps will be repeated to each incident scenario. 
The frequency of each incident scenario will be estimated and then all frequencies can 
be compared each other to rank the risks among incident scenarios. This risk ranking 
may be used to find out the priority of maintenance (or repair) or safety measures. 
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3.2. THE SUMMARY OF FAILURE DATA 
 
In order to use the Bayesian engine and obtain the updated failure data, generic 
data and plant specific data should be available. For this research, several data sources 
were gathered and some of them will be used. Brief introduction of each data source 
may be useful to choose appropriate data sources. 
 
3.2.1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN IMPROVED LNG PLANT FAILURE 
RATE DATA BASE 
 
Johnson and Welker [27] have reported a survey of events on LNG plants. The 
data were obtained from 27 separate LNG facilities including LNG base loads or satellite 
facilities. The plant in-service time is approximately 1,626,000 hours. The data base 
provided operating hours, the number of failures, and mean time between failures 
(MTBF) of major equipments as shown in Figure 3.2. The data source will be used as 
plant specific data of likelihood function in Bayesian estimation. 
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Figure 3.2  Summary of major failures in LNG plant failure rate data base [27] 
 
3.2.2. EIReDA  
 
The EIReDA (European Industry Reliability Data Bank) is operated by ESReDA 
(European Safety and Reliability Research and Development Association). The data 
were collected from nuclear power plants operated by Electricite de France and analyzed 
using Bayesian logic. It provides the mean values of frequency and PFD as well as 
distribution parameters. In the data source, gamma distribution was used for failure 
frequency and the values of α and β parameters were provided. For probability of failure 
on demand, beta distribution and its values of α and β parameters were provided as 
shown in Figure 3.3. EIReDA will be used as generic data of a prior distribution in 
Bayesian estimation, especially for the PFDs of IPLs. 
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Figure 3.3  Example from EIReDA data bank [28] 
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3.2.3. OREDA 
 
OREDA (The Offshore Reliability Data) is based on the off-shore installations 
such as platforms. It gives the number of failures, operational time, failure rates, 
standard deviations, and mean repair time as shown Figure 3.4. It also provides lower, 
mean, and upper values based on gamma distribution for the huge number of items. It 
will be used as one of the generic data of prior distribution in Bayesian estimation for 
initiating event frequencies as well as PFDs of IPLs. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4  Example from OREDA database [28] 
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3.2.4. CCPS 
 
CCPS (The Center for Chemical Process Safety) provided “Guidelines for 
process equipment reliability data with data tables” for process equipment, process 
systems, and chemical manufacturing operations. It provides failure frequencies with 
lower, mean, and upper as well as PFDs. It used the lognormal distribution to identify 
the credible intervals. However, it didn’t provide the number of failures and number of 
demands. 
 
3.2.5. OTHERS 
 
Other data sources which may be used for risk assessments have been founded: 
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant Failure Rate Database [28] , SES Long Beach LNG 
Import Project (Quantitative Risk Analysis) [29], and Comparative Risk Assessment of 
LNG Tank Designs Training [7]. Table 3.1 shows the comparison among several data 
sources which may show their own characteristics and given types of data.
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Table 3.1  The comparison of failure data sources 
 
Class. base Frequency of initiating events PFDs of IPLs Mean failure time 
Data source 
No. of 
failure 
Operating 
time 
mean Distribution S.D. EF 
No. of 
demand 
mean distribution S.D. EF MTBF MTTR 
Repair 
time(man 
hour) 
EIReDA ○ ○ ○ 
○ 
Gamma(α,β) 
  ○ ○ 
○ 
Beta(α,β) 
   ○ ○ 
OREDA ○ ○ ○ 
○ 
Gamma 
○  ○       ○ 
CCPS   ○ 
○ 
Lognormal 
   ○ 
○ 
Lognormal 
     
Idaho   ○ 
○ 
Lognormal 
○ ○  ○ 
○ 
Lognormal 
 ○    
LNG data 
base 
○ ○          ○   
QRA Long 
beach LNG 
  ○     ○       
Comparative 
LNG tank 
(KGS) 
  ○ 
○ 
Gamma 
○   ○ 
○ 
Normal 
○     
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3.3. BAYESIAN ESTIMATION FOR INITIATING EVENTS 
 
The frequencies of initiating events can be estimated by Bayesian engine. The 
gamma distribution is used as a conjugate prior distribution with Poisson distribution as 
a likelihood function. The posterior data of failure frequency also are obtained from 
gamma distribution according to conjugate concept. OREDA data made from gamma 
distribution are used as a prior distribution. LNG plant failure rate database which is a 
plant specific data is used as a likelihood function of Poisson distribution. The updated 
posterior failure frequencies of initiating events will be estimated by Bayesian logic (or 
engine). However, OREDA data have one different parameter in the gamma distribution 
which is used in Bayesian estimation with a gamma conjugate prior. The equation 3.1 
(which is also shown in Section 2.1) is the equation of the gamma distribution in 
Bayesian estimation for initiating events and equation 3.2 is the equation of gamma 
distribution of OREDA database. 
λβα
α
λ
α
βλ −−
Γ
= ef 1)()(         (3.1) 
λ
γα
α
γ
λ
α
α
λ
α
γλ
αγ
λ
)1(
11
)(
)1(
)(
1)(
−
−
−
−
Γ
=
Γ
= eef      (3.2) 
 By comparing equation 3.1 and 3.2, one difference can be found in a parameter 
and the parameter relationship is 
γ
β 1=           (3.3) 
When equation 3.3 is substituted into equation 2.12, the equations of posterior 
parameters are 
priorpriorpostpriorpost ttx γββαα /1, +=+=+=     (3.4) 
Then, mean frequency of posterior distribution is 
prior
prior
prior
prior
post
post
post t
x
t
x
γ
α
β
α
β
α
µ
/1+
+
=
+
+
==      (3.5) 
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Other procedures are same within Section 2.3.1, and Figure 3.5 shows the 
schematic diagram of the Bayesian estimation for failure frequencies of initiating events. 
When there is little belief of prior distribution or generic data are not available 
for some equipment, Jeffreys non-information prior may be used. As shown in Section 
2.3.1, the Jeffreys non-informative prior distribution can be a gamma distribution which 
shape parameter, α, is equal to ½ and scale parameter, β, is equal to zero. Thus, posterior 
parameters for Jeffreys non-informative prior is  
tx postpost =+= βα ,5.0        (3.6) 
Thus, posterior mean of Jeffreys prior is 
t
x
post
post
post
5.0+
== β
α
µ        (3.7) 
 Other procedures are the same within Section 2.3.1, and a schematic diagram for 
Jeffreys non-informative prior is shown in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.5  The schematic diagram of Bayesian estimation for initiating events with 
informative prior 
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Figure 3.6  The schematic diagram of Bayesian estimation for initiating events with 
Jeffreys non-informative prior 
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3.4. BAYESIAN ESTIMATION FOR IPLs 
 
The PFDs of IPLs can be estimated by Bayesian engine. The beta distribution is 
used as a conjugate prior with binomial distribution as likelihood function. The posterior 
data of PFD also are obtained from beta distribution according to conjugate concept. 
EIReDA data made from beta distribution for PFD are used as a prior distribution 
preferentially. When PFD values and two parameters (α and β) of beta distribution of 
some pieces of equipment are available in EIReDA database, they can be used directly 
as the information of prior distribution in the Bayesian estimation. However, when there 
is no failure data about some pieces of equipment in EIReDA, OREDA may be used 
after converting frequency into PFD using the frequency-PFD conversion method. LNG 
plant failure rate data base which is a plant specific data is used as a likelihood function 
of binomial distribution. However, even though some failure rate data are available in 
LNG plant data base, it didn’t provide the number of demands. The number of demands 
is one of the essential information to the binomial distribution together with the number 
of failures. Thus, it may be estimated by correlation between the equation of a point 
estimate and the PFD estimating equation. After that, the updated posterior PFD of an 
IPL will be estimated by Bayesian logic (or engine) with beta distribution. 
 According to Sandia National Laboratories [23], if it is assumed that the 
probability is not dependent on the starting time of the period, t, and failures of systems 
during standby periods are independent of each other, the probability that a system is 
failed when observed at time t is 
tep λ−−= 1          (3.8) 
where λ is the failure rate. 
If it is assumed that there is periodic test of equipment and the unplanned 
demands occur at a random time within the testing cycle, in other words, the failures are 
revealed by the test, the PFD can be approximately estimated by 
2
testTPFD
λ
=          (3.9) 
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where testT  is the proof test interval. The information of test intervals was shown 
in Table 1.2 and it will be used to obtain PFDs for this research. 
As shown in Section 2.3.2, a point estimate of p which is the most commonly 
used frequentist estimate is 
nxPFD /=
∧
         (3.10) 
where x is the observed number of failures and n is the observed number of 
demands. 
According to Crowl [25], if it is assumed that failure rate, λ, is constant, MTBF 
which means the time interval between two failures of the component is given by 
λ
1
=MTBF          (3.11) 
If it is assumed that the PFD value of point estimate in equation 3.10 is the same 
mean value in equation 3.9, the correlation of equation 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 can give the 
equation of the number of demands as such 
testtest T
xMTBF
T
x
n
22
== λ        (3.12) 
By using the equation 3.12, the number of demands of operation can be estimated 
with the number of failures, MTBF, and proof test interval. 
 Now, the posterior mean of PFD can be calculated using equation 2.28 and a 
schematic diagram of Bayesian estimation for PFD of an IPL is given in Figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7  The schematic diagram of Bayesian estimation for IPLs with informative 
prior of EIReDA 
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When EIReDA does not provide failure data about some pieces of equipment, 
OREDA may be used after converting frequency into PFD using the frequency-PFD 
conversion method as shown in Figure 3.8. OREDA is failure frequency data based on 
gamma distribution, but it is necessary to get PFD based on beta distribution. OREDA 
provides frequency intervals with lower (5% credible), mean, and upper (95% credible). 
It is possible to convert failure frequency into PFD using equation 3.9. By using 
equation 3.9, PFD interval from frequency interval can be obtained. Beta distribution is a 
flexible family of distributions that is useful for modeling phenomena that can range 
from 0 to 1. Probability shall range from 0 to 1. Thus, it may be assumed that obtained 
PFD intervals follow the beta distribution. In other words, the PFD values of lower, 
mean, and upper follow the beta distribution. In a beta distribution, there are two 
parameters (α, β) and equation of a mean value is 
βα
αµ
+
=          (3.13) 
If equation 3.13 is rewritten by β, the equation is 
µ
µαβ )1( −=          (3.14) 
If three factors which are the lower PFD value (5% credible), parameter α, and 
parameter β described with α and µ, parameter α can be calculated by  
005.0)/)1(,,(
05.0)/)1(,,(
=−−
=−
µµαα
µµαα
L
L
PFDBetadist
PFDBetadist
     (3.15) 
where “betadist” is the abbreviation of cumulative beta probability density 
function. In equation 3.15, PFDL and µ are already known and α is the only unknown 
variable, thus α can be found in an equality equation. Several spreadsheet programs such 
as MS/EXCEL provide the function of beta distribution and the solver function. Thus, 
the parameter α can be obtained using these software packages. If the obtained value of 
α parameter and known mean value, µ, are put into the equation 3.14, the value of β 
parameter can be found. Therefore, the obtained two parameters (α, β) can be used for 
the information of prior beta distribution in Bayesian estimation. 
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As shown in Figure 3.9, after getting two parameters of prior beta distribution, 
the procedures of likelihood function and posterior distribution estimated by Bayesian 
logic is same with the EIReDA case as a prior distribution (see Figure 3.7). 
When there is little belief of prior distribution or generic data are not available 
for some equipment, Jeffreys non-information prior may be used. As shown in Section 
2.3.2, the Jeffreys non-informative prior distribution can be a beta distribution which 
both parameter, α, and parameter, β, are equal to ½. Thus, posterior parameters for 
Jeffreys non-informative prior is  
5.0,5.0 +−=+= xnx postpost βα       (3.16) 
Thus, posterior mean of Jeffreys prior is 
1
5.0
+
+
=
+
=
n
x
postpost
post
post βα
α
µ       (3.17) 
 Other procedures are same with the case of informative prior, and a schematic 
diagram for Jeffreys non-informative prior is shown in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.8  Frequency-PFD conversion method 
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Figure 3.9  The schematic diagram of Bayesian estimation for IPLs with informative 
prior of OREDA 
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Figure 3.10  The schematic diagram of Bayesian estimation for IPLs with Jeffreys non-
informative prior 
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probability as a redundancy. For example, two pressure relief valves should be installed 
in a LNG storage tank required by NFPA 59A [6]. The valves may have common cause 
failures due to same manufacturer’s production or same operational environments. Even 
though they may not be independent each other and two valves may not be considered as 
respective IPLs, the use of two pressure relief valves provides additional safety than the 
installation of only one valve. Thus, it is necessary to set up the estimation methods of 
PFD for multiple devices.  
In the LNG industry, several types of multiple protections may be found as such 
1oo2 (one out of two) and 2oo3 (two out of three). 1oo2 means that if only one of two 
devices work properly, the system will run successfully: in other words, both devices 
should fail for the system failure. 
In case of 1oo2 system, the average of PFD is 
)
2
()( 211 MTTR
T
PFDPFD testoo βλβλ ++=      (3.18) 
Where β is the common cause factor, λ is the failure rate, Ttest is the proof test 
interval, and MTTR is the mean time to repair. 
If it is assumed that MTTR is much less than Ttest, the last term of the equation 
3.18 may be negligible. Practically, this assumption is reasonable because test interval is 
a lot larger than the repair time. Then equation 3.18 may be simplified as 
)()(
)
2
()(
11
2
11
2
11
oooo
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+=
      (3.19) 
The second term on the right-hand side of equation 3.19 represents the effect of 
common cause failure. 
In case of 2oo3 system, the average PFD is 
)()(3
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2
()(3
11
2
11
2
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test
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PFDPFD
T
PFDPFD
β
βλ
+=
+=
      (3.20) 
According to Summers [30], the common cause factor, β, has not been published 
yet to support the selection of beta factor. The selection may be decided by experience-
  
 
73 
based expert judgment. However, if the multiple devices are designed to minimize the 
potential for common cause failure, the beta factor can be ranged from 0.1% to 5% for 
field device modeling. Corresponding to industrial expert judgments, the beta factor used 
for valves may be 0.1% and for sensors may be 5%. This estimation method for common 
cause failure will be used for multiple items in this research.  
As a reference, following measures may be used to reduce the common cause 
effects: 
 Diversity 
For example, use of different type of valves, sensors, or different technologies, 
different manufacturers. 
 Suitability 
Use the devices where they make sense. 
 Simplicity 
The simpler system is, the less common cause failures exist. 
 
3.6. BAYESIAN-LOPA SPREADSHEET 
 
After obtaining the frequencies of initiating events and PFDs of IPLs, the data 
can be plugged into a LOPA spreadsheet as shown in Table 3.2. The spreadsheet can 
automatically compute the frequency of an incident scenario when the required data are 
input. The estimated frequency is compared to tolerable risk criteria, and whether it 
meets the criteria or not will be recorded in a space of “criteria met?” For every incident 
scenario, the same procedure will be applied and then the frequency values obtained 
from each scenario can be compared each other to rank the risk. 
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Table 3.2  The format of LOPA spreadsheet of this research 
 
Scenario No. Scenario Title :  Node No. 
Date Description Probability 
Frequency 
(per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
      
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required  
Tolerable 
  < 1x10
-3
 
< 1x10-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
      
Enabling event 
or condition 
      
      
      
      
Conditional modifiers 
(if applicable) 
      
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
      
Independent 
Protection Layers 
      
Total PFD for all IPLs       
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence 
      
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) 
      
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
      
Notes    
References    
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4. RESULTS OF BAYESIAN-LOPA METHODOLOGY AND 
VALIDATION 
 
4.1. THE RESULTS OF HAZOP STUDY AND SCENARIO MAKING 
 
The HAZOP study was conducted by a team which consisted of one professor, 
two post doctors, and seven graduate students from the Artie Mcferrin department of 
chemical engineering at Texas A&M University and the Mary Kay O’Connor Process 
Safety Center on July 19, 2007. The results are shown in Appendix B. However, the 
HAZOP study was not fully completed because of insufficient process information and 
use of simplified process flow diagram and P&ID. In other words, the study was focused 
on a few incident cases which may have outcomes with major dangerous consequences. 
For the HAZOP study, three nodes were considered in an LNG importation terminal as 
shown in Table 4.1. 
The HAZOP study created approximately twenty incident cases. Each scenario of 
LOPA was created by combination of a cause and a consequence in the HAZOP results. 
For LOPA study, seven scenarios, as shown in Table 4.2, were chosen according to the 
severity of consequences and the importance of equipment. Two scenarios were chosen 
in the unloading arm area (node 1) and recondenser & HP pump area (node 2), and three 
scenarios were selected in the storage tank system (node 3). 
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Table 4.1  HAZOP nodes in a LNG terminal 
 
Node Description/design intent Design conditions/parameters 
1. LNG liquid 
unloading 
from ship to 
tank 
LNG unloads from tanker (ship) to 
a storage tank 
A shutdown valve is provided 
at the unloading arm 
2. LP LNG 
pump 
discharge to 
recondenser & 
HP pump 
suction 
LP LNG pump feeds LNG to HP 
LNG pump to boost. This LNG is 
passed through recondenser to 
condense BOG. 
LP pump is provided in each 
tank to supply LNG to HP 
pump which boosts this liquid 
to higher pressure. 
3. LNG tank 
system 
LNG will be stored in this tank and 
then be sent through recondenser to 
vaporizer. 
 Pressure of a tank is almost 
atmospheric pressure and 
insulation is provided to keep 
LNG cool. 
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Table 4.2  LOPA incident scenarios 
 
Scenario 
No. 
Node 
No. 
Causes Consequences Scenarios 
1 1 Loading arm failures 
due to flange joint or 
swivel joint failures 
Release of LNG due to 
loading arm failures 
resulting from swivel 
joints failure and flange 
joints failures 
LNG leakage from loading arms 
during unloading 
2 1 During unloading, 
BV-1 spurious trip 
closure 
Pressure increase of 
unloading arm 
Pressure increase of unloading 
arm due to BV-1 failed closure 
during unloading 
3 2 BV-32 spurious 
failed closure 
HP pump damage 
leading to possible 
leakage and fire 
HP pump cavitation and damage 
due to lower pressure of 
recondenser resulting from BV-32 
failed closure. Leakage and fire. 
4 2 FCV-33 spurious full 
open 
LNG level increase and 
leads to carryover into 
annular space resulting 
in possible overpressure 
in tank 
Higher temperature in 
recondenser due to more BOG 
input resulting from FCV-33 
spurious full open. Cavitation and 
pump damage leading to leakage 
5 3 Rollover due to 
stratification 
Overpressure in tank 
and possible damage 
Overpressure in tank due to 
rollover resulting from 
stratification and possible damage 
in tank 
6 3 Human errors 
(operator lines up the 
wrong tank) 
LNG level increases 
and leads to carryover 
into annular space 
resulting in possible 
overpressure in tank 
LNG level increases and leads to 
carryover into annular space of 
LNG because operator lines up 
the wrong tank. Possible 
overpressure in tank. 
7 3 LP pump-out without 
BOG input due to 
BV-25 spurious 
failed closure 
Underpressure in tank 
and possible damage of 
tank 
Underpressure in tank due to 
pump-out without BOG input 
resulting from BV-45 fail closure. 
Possible damage of tank 
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4.2. LOOK-UP TABLE OF FAILURE RATES 
 
The look-up table shows all failure data of frequency or probability of failure on 
demands of equipment or operational systems which were used in this research. In other 
words, the look-up table may be the summary sheet of failure data so that researchers or 
analysts can easily look at failure rate or probability data of equipment which were used 
in a research or risk analysis and apply to risk assessment methods. It provides generic 
failure data as a prior distribution and LNG plant specific data as a likelihood function. 
For the prior information, either EIReDA or OREDA data base was used according to 
data availability. For the likelihood information, LNG plant failure rate data base 
collected from LNG facilities was used. 
It was classified into two parts; the frequencies of initiating event and the PFDs 
of IPLs. Table 4.3 provides the frequency data of initiating events and Table 4-4 shows 
PFDs of IPLs. Moreover, those look-up tables also include alpha and beta parameter 
values of gamma and beta distribution for some pieces of equipment. 
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Table 4.3  Look-up table of failure frequencies of initiating events 
 
Class. Prior information likelihood information 
event min mean(/y) max S.D. reference & note operating years 
no.of  
failures reference & note 
rollover 6.50E-03 1.20E-02 2.60E-02 5.60E-03 [7], KGS, p.321 2.09E+02 4 [27], cryogenic storage 
systems, major 
Shut-off 
Valve (BV) 
fail close 
8.64E-05 5.53E-03 1.78E-02 6.48E-03 [31], OREDA, p.788 (spurious operation) 7.27E+02 4 [27], cryogenic valves, major 
human errors 
in filling 
procedures 
     5.53E+02 19 [27], human errors, major 
FCV fail to 
regulate 0.00E+00 2.73E-02 1.33E-01 5.50E-02 
[31], OREDA, p.732 
(fail to regulate) 7.27E+02 4 [27], cryogenic valves, major 
loading arm 
failure 0.00E+00 3.80E-03 1.93E-02 8.27E-03 [31], OREDA, p.821 1.34E+02 5 
[27], truck loading and 
unloading, overall 
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Table 4.4  Look-up table of failure probabilities of IPLs 
 
Class. Prior information likelihood information 
test 
interval 
(year) 
event PFD lower 
PFD 
mean 
PFD 
upper Alpha beta SD 
Lower 
(/y) 
Mean 
(/y) 
Upper 
(/y) SD reference 
No. of 
failure 
MTBF 
(year) reference  
PRV, VRV 3.00E-04 
4.70E-
04 
6.00E-
04 
2.90E
+01 
6.20E
+04      
[32], 
EIReDA 
p.105 
4 1.82E
+02 
[27], 
cryogenic 
valves, 
major 
2.0000 
EMOV, BV 
(stop valve) 
7.20E-
04 
1.16E-
03 
1.56E-
03 
4.97E
+00 
4.29E
+03      
[32], 
EIReDA 
p.127 
24 3.03E
+01 
[27], 
cryogenic 
valves, 
overall 
0.0833 
FCV 
(Solenoid 
valves) 
2.00E-
04 
2.80E-
04 
3.80E-
04 
1.63E
+01 
5.69E
+04      
[32], 
EIReDA 
p.99 
4 1.82E
+02 
[27], 
cryogenic 
valves, 
major 
1.0000 
pressure 
alarm       
1.73E-
04 
4.22E-
02 
1.62E-
01 
5.96
E-
02 
[31], 
OREDA 
p.559 
  N.A. 0.0833 
density 
monitor 
4.00E-
03 
8.00E-
03 
1.60E-
02   
4.00
E-
03 
    
[7], 
KGS,  
p.323 
    
fire detector 
(flame-
infrared) 
      
3.46E-
04 
6.31E-
03 
3.02E-
02 
6.31
E-
03 
[31], 
OREDA 
p.520 
12 1.02E
+02 
[27], flame 
detector, 
major 
0.5000 
gas detector 
(hydro-
carbon gas) 
      
1.14E-
02 
5.64E-
02 
8.88E-
02 
2.91
E-
02 
[31], 
OREDA 
p.526 
44 4.40E
+01 
[27], gas 
detectors, 
major 
0.0833 
 
 
 
80
 
  
 
81 
Table 4.4  Continued 
 
Class. Prior information likelihood information 
test 
interval 
(year) 
event PFD lower 
PFD 
mean 
PFD 
upper alpha beta SD 
Lower 
(/y) 
Mean 
(/y) 
Upper 
(/y) SD reference 
No. of 
failure 
MTBF 
(year) reference  
HP, LP 
pump 
1.10E-
04 
1.90E-
04 
2.70E-
04 
8.80E
+00 
4.41E
+04      
[32], 
EIReDA 
p.53 
7 4.75E
+00 
[27], 
cryogenic 
pump, 
minor 
0.0833 
BOG 
compressor  
reciprocating 
1.40E-
04 
2.30E-
04 
3.40E-
04 
8.60E
+00 
3.70E
+04      
[32], 
EIReDA, 
p.28 
116 2.20E
+00 
[27], 
compressor 
systems, 
major 
0.0833 
level 
detector 
and alarm 
      
1.28E-
02 
4.02E-
02 
8.00E-
02 
2.11
E-
02 
[31], 
OREDA 
p.544 
9 1.93E
+01 
[27], 
process 
control 
system, 
major 
1.0000 
operator 
fail to 
shutdown 
on high 
level alarm 
2.00E-
04 
8.00E-
04 
3.00E-
02   
1.30
E-
03 
    
[7], 
KGS,  
p.337 
    
temperature 
alarm       
2.59E-
04 
5.52E-
02 
2.10E-
01 
7.74
E-
02 
[31], 
OREDA 
p.560 
2 1.52E
+02 
[27], low 
temp. 
detector, 
major 
0.0833 
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4.3. RESULTS OF RISKS 
 
4.3.1. UNLOADING ARM AREA (NODE 1) 
 
In the unloading arm area (node 1), two Bayesian-LOPA incident scenarios were 
prepared.  
 
4.3.1.1. SCENARIO 1 (LNG LEAKAGE FROM LOADING ARMS 
DURING UNLOADING) 
 
LNG may leak during the unloading operation if there are failures of flange or 
swivel joints in unloading arms. The consequence of liquid line failure will be much 
more severe than the one of vapor return line failure because LNG can be vaporized into 
gas with the volume of 600 times of gas phase. Careful measures should be taken in the 
unloading arm area because arms have several joints which may be likely to be leakage 
sources and be vulnerable to external impacts such as bad weathers or ship tanker 
movements. 
The frequency of the loading arm failures as an initiating event may be estimated 
with the OREDA data and LNG facility failure data base. OREDA provides the failure 
frequency of a flowline including joints, pipe spool, isolation valve, and pipe. It is used 
as prior information of generic data in Bayesian estimation. The LNG failure database 
gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the truck loading and 
unloading facilities. The data of truck loading facilities does not exactly fit unloading 
arms of a ship tanker, but it still can be used for a ship tanker because the configuration 
and design of truck loading arms are similar to the one of tanker unloading arms. Thus, 
the failure data of truck unloading arms are used as likelihood information of plant 
specific data. The estimated frequency data (per year) are shown in Figure 4.1. Figure 
4.1 shows that the posterior value of failure frequency is between prior and likelihood 
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values. It means that the posterior values is updated with prior and likelihood 
information. That is to say, it means that the posterior value reflects both long-term 
based historical data from generic data and short-term based plant specific data. The 
vertical line of posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval ranged 
from 0.0104/year to 0.0483/year. The detail information of these calculations is given in 
Appendix C. 
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Figure 4.1  Frequency of a loading arm failure corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
For this scenario, two IPLs may be considered. One is the gas detector and 
human intervention. The other is the fire detector and ESD valve. It is assumed that the 
functions of gas detector and fire detector are independent each other, and human 
intervention can be performed perfectly.  
IPL 1 is the gas detector and human intervention. The PFD of gas detector 
failures can be estimated with the OREDA data and LNG facility failure data base. 
OREDA provides the failure frequency of a hydrocarbon gas detector. These data should 
be converted into PFD by using Frequency-PFD conversion method as shown in Figure 
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3.8. The method can produce PFD as well as two parameter values of α and β of beta 
distribution. The parameter values are used as prior information. The LNG failure 
database provides the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the gas detector 
which can be used as likelihood information of LNG plant specific data. The estimated 
PFDs of gas detectors are shown in Figure 4.2. The value is considered as the PFD of the 
IPL 1 because of the assumption of perfect human performance. Figure 4.2 shows that 
the posterior value of PFD is located between prior and likelihood values. The vertical 
line of posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval ranged from 
0.0007 to 0.0012.  
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Figure 4.2  PFDs of a gas detector corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
IPL 2 is the fire detector and the ESD valve. The PFD of fire detector failures can 
be estimated with the OREDA data and LNG facility failure data base. OREDA provides 
the failure frequency of a flame infrared fire detector. These data should be converted 
into PFD by using Frequency-PFD conversion method. The LNG failure database 
provides the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the flame detector which 
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can be used as likelihood information. The estimated PFDs of flame detectors are shown 
in Figure 4.3. The vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian 
credible interval ranged from 0.0014 to 0.0035.  
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Figure 4.3  PFDs of a flame detector corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
However, IPL 2 consists of the fire detector and the ESD valve. The PFD of ESD 
valve should be estimated also to identify the PFD of IPL 2. The PFD of an ESD valve 
can be estimated with the EIReDA data and LNG facility failure data base. EIReDA 
provides the mean value of PFD and parameter values of α and β in beta distribution for 
the electric motor operated stop valve (EMOV). They are used as prior information. The 
LNG failure database gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the 
cryogenic valves. The estimated PFDs of an ESD valve are shown in Figure 4.4. The 
vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval ranged 
from 0.0010 to 0.0018.  
  
 
86 
The failure case of IPL 2 shall be either failure of fire detector or an ESD valve. 
Thus, if it is assumed that fire detector and ESD valve is independent each other, 
following Boolean algebra equation can be used to estimate PFD of IPL 2. 
)Pr()Pr()Pr()Pr()Pr( BABABA ×−+=∪      (4.1) 
 Therefore, total PFDs of IPL 2 are shown in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.4  PFDs of an ESD valve corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
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Figure 4.5  Total PFDs of an IPL 2 corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
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Consequently, the mitigated failure frequency of scenario 1 can be estimated 
with the LOPA spreadsheet as shown in Table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.5  LOPA spreadsheet of incident scenario 1 
 
Scenario No. 
1 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
LNG leakage from Loading arms during unloading 
Node No. 
1 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Release of LNG due to loading arm 
failures resulting from swivel joints 
failure and flange joints failures 
    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
Loading arm failures due to flange 
joint or swivel joint failures   2.75E-02 
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    2.75E-02 
Gas detectors at the jetty and 
human intervention 9.75E-04   
Fire detector and ESD 3.68E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
      
Total PFD for all IPLs   3.59E-06   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    9.87E-08 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. Test intervals should be kept as 
following to keep the PFD (ESV and 
gas detector: 1 month, fire 
detector: 6 months). 
2. The logic solver of gas and fire 
detector should be independent to 
get full credits of IPLs. Otherwise, 
one of them cannot be an IPL. 
    
Notes       
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The comparison of risk values of scenario 1 among prior, likelihood, and 
posterior information is given in Figure 4.6. Figure 4.6 shows that the posterior value of 
failure frequency is located between prior and likelihood values. However, this trend is 
not always followed to all risk values estimated by LOPA for incidents. The posterior 
value of each initiating event or IPL should exist between the prior and likelihood values 
if an informative prior distribution is used for Bayesian estimation. If an initiating event 
and all IPLs have the same trend as shown in Figure 4.6, the final risk values estimated 
by LOPA will have the same trend because the values are multiplied each other. But, if 
an initiating event or some IPLs have different trends with Figure 4.6, the posterior 
values of risks may not be located between prior and likelihood values. In other words, 
some scenarios may have ascending or descending trends among prior, likelihood, and 
posterior values. The detail explanation and an example are shown in Section 4.4. 
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Figure 4.6  Risk values of scenario 1 by LOPA 
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For the risk determination, the estimated posterior risk value, 9.87E-8, can be 
compared to the tolerable criteria, less than 1.00E-5. Thus, the risk decision is that 
scenario 1 is tolerable if the test intervals and independency between gas and fire 
detector given in the actions of Table 4.5 will be kept. 
 
4.3.1.2. SCENARIO 2 (PRESSURE INCREASE OF UNLOADING ARM 
DUE TO BV-1 FAILED CLOSURE DURING UNLOADING) 
 
A block valve, BV-1, is installed to stop the flow of LNG in the LNG unloading 
pipeline in case of emergency. However, if the valve is closed accidentally due to 
spurious trip of the valve during unloading procedure, the pressure within unloading 
arms and pipelines will be increased to shut-off pressure of ship pumps. It may cause the 
undesirable consequences in the arms or pipelines. 
The frequency of the spurious trip to close of a block valve as an initiating event 
may be estimated with the OREDA data and LNG facility failure data base. OREDA 
provides the failure frequency of a spurious operation for a shut-off valve. It is used as 
prior information of generic data in Bayesian estimation. The LNG failure data base 
gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the cryogenic valves which 
can be used as likelihood information of plant specific data. The estimated frequency 
data (per year) are shown in Figure 4.7. Figure 4.7 shows that the posterior value of 
failure frequency is located between prior and likelihood values. It means that the 
posterior values is updated with prior and likelihood information. That is to say, the 
posterior reflect both long-term based historical data from generic data and short-term 
based plant specific data. The vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% 
Bayesian credible interval ranged from 0.0019/year to 0.0099/year. The detail 
information of these calculations is given in Appendix C. 
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Figure 4.7  Frequency of a spurious trip to close of a block valve corresponding to 
Bayesian estimation 
 
For this scenario, one IPL may be considered. It is the temperature safety valve 
(TSV). The PFD of a TSV can be estimated with the EIReDA data and LNG facility 
failure data base. EIReDA provides the mean value of PFD and parameter values of α 
and β in beta distribution for the pressure relief valve (PRV). The TSV has almost the 
same design configuration with PRV, so the failure data of PRV will be used. They are 
used as prior information. The LNG failure database provides the operating hours, 
number of failures, and MTBF of the cryogenic valves. The data base did not give the 
specific failure data of pressure relief valves. However, it provides the failure data of 
cryogenic valves. Thus, cryogenic valve data will be used for the pressure relief valves 
in this research. The estimated PFDs of a TSV are shown in Figure 4.8. The vertical line 
of the posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval ranged from 0.0004 
to 0.0007.  
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Figure 4.8  PFDs of a TSV corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
Consequently, the mitigated failure frequency of scenario 2 can be estimated 
with the LOPA spreadsheet as shown in Table 4.6. The comparison of risk values for 
scenario 2 is given in Figure 4.9. Figure 4.9 shows that the posterior value of failure 
frequency is located between prior and likelihood values.  
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Table 4.6  LOPA spreadsheet of incident scenario 2 
 
Scenario No. 
 
2 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
Pressure increase of unloading arm due to BV-1 
failed closure during unloading 
Node No. 
 
1 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category Pressure increase of unloading arm     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
During unloading, BV-1 spurious trip 
close   5.51E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
N/A     Conditional modifiers 
(if applicable) N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.51E-03 
A TSV along transfer line 5.26E-04   
      Independent Protection Layers 
      
Total PFD for all IPLs   5.26E-04   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    2.90E-06 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. A PSV may be installed before 
TSV, unless TSV can operate as a 
PSV in case of overpressure. 
    
Notes 
1. Unloading arm and pipe were 
designed to bear the shut-off 
pressure of ship pump. 
    
References       
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Frequency comparison of incident scenario
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Figure 4.9  Risk values of scenario 2 by LOPA 
 
For the risk determination, the estimated posterior risk value, 2.90E-6, can be 
compared to the tolerable criteria, less than 1.00E-5. Thus, risk decision is that scenario 
2 is tolerable. 
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4.3.2. RECONDENSER AND HP PUMP AREA (NODE 2) 
 
4.3.2.1. SCENARIO 3 (HP PUMP CAVITATION AND DAMAGE DUE TO 
LOW PRESSURE OF RECONDENSER RESULTING FROM BV-
32 FAILED CLOSURE. POSSIBLE LEAKAGE AND FIRE) 
 
If the pressure of the recondenser is very low due to BV-32 spurious trip to close, 
the HP pump which is located downstream from the recondenser may be damaged due to 
cavitation resulting in possible leakages.  
The frequency of the spurious trip to close of a block valve as an initiating event 
may be estimated with the OREDA data and LNG facility failure data base as such 
scenario 2. OREDA provides the failure frequency of a spurious operation of a shut-off 
valve. The LNG failure data base gives the operating hours, number of failures, and 
MTBF of the cryogenic valves which can be used for likelihood information as plant 
specific data. The estimated frequency data (per year) are shown in Figure 4.10. Figure 
4.10 shows that the posterior value of failure frequency is between prior and likelihood 
values. The vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible 
interval ranged from 0.0019/year to 0.0099/year. The detail information of these 
calculations is given in appendix C. 
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Figure 4.10  Frequency of a spurious trip to close of a block valve corresponding to 
Bayesian estimation 
 
For this scenario, one IPL may be considered. It is the low pressure alarm and HP 
pump trip to stop. The PFD of a pressure alarm can be estimated with the OREDA data 
and LNG facility failure database. OREDA provides the failure frequency of a pressure 
sensor. These data should be converted into PFD by using Frequency-PFD conversion 
method for prior information. The LNG failure database gives the operating hours, 
number of failures, and MTBF of the process control system which includes any 
occurrence which caused a loss of function of the process control system. That is, 
process control system can include the pressure sensors. Thus, the data are used as the 
likelihood function. The estimated PFDs of a pressure alarm are shown in Figure 4.11. 
The vertical line of posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval 
ranged from 0.0011 to 0.0034.  
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Figure 4.11  PFDs of a pressure alarm corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
However, IPL 1 consists of the pressure alarm and HP pump trip. The PFD of HP 
pump also should be estimated to find out the PFD of IPL 1. The PFD of an HP pump 
can be estimated with the EIReDA data and LNG facility failure data base. EIReDA 
provides the mean value of PFD and parameter values of α and β in beta distribution for 
a pump. The LNG failure database gives the operating hours, number of failures, and 
MTBF of the cryogenic pumps. The estimated PFDs of an HP pump are shown in Figure 
4.12. The vertical line of posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval 
ranged from 0.0002 to 0.0005.  
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Figure 4.12  PFDs of an ESD valve corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
The failure case of IPL 1 shall be either failure of a low pressure alarm or HP 
pump. Thus, if it is assumed that pressure alarm and HP pump is independent each other, 
the Boolean algebra equation can be used to estimate PFD of IPL 1 as given in equation 
4.1. Therefore, total PFDs of IPL 1 are shown in Figure 4.13. 
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Figure 4.13  Total PFDs of the IPL corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
Consequently, the mitigated failure frequency of scenario 3 can be estimated 
with the LOPA spreadsheet as shown in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7  LOPA spreadsheet of incident scenario 3 
 
Scenario No. 
 
3 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
HP pump cavitation and damage due to low 
pressure of recondenser resulting from BV-32 failed 
closure. Possible leakage and fire. 
Node No. 
 
2 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
HP pump damage leading to possible 
leakage and fire     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) BV-32 spurious fail close   5.51E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
N/A     Conditional modifiers 
(if applicable) N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.51E-03 
Low pressure alarm and HP pump trip 2.48E-03   
      Independent Protection Layers 
      
Total PFD for all IPLs   2.48E-03   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    1.37E-05 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) NO     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. HP pump should be tripped in case 
of low-low level of recondenser 
2. It is better that the HP pump is an 
auto circulation type to control the 
pump out and prevent cavitation. 
3. The test intervals of pressure alarm 
and HP pump should be kept 1 
month, respectively. 
    
Notes       
References       
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The comparison of risk values of scenario 3 is given in Figure 4.14. Figure 4.14 
shows that the posterior value of failure frequency is located between prior and 
likelihood values.  
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Figure 4.14  Risk values of scenario 3 by LOPA 
 
For the risk determination, the estimated posterior risk value, 1.37E-5, can be 
compared to the tolerable criteria, less than 1.00E-5. Thus, risk decision is that scenario 
3 is not tolerable, so additional IPLs should be required. Two recommendations are 
suggested as shown in the actions of Table 4.7. First, the HP pump should be tripped in 
case of low-low level of the recondenser to prevent the cavitation of HP pump, and 
second, the HP pump may be an auto circulation type to control the pump out and 
prevent cavitation. If these actions are applied to the equipment, the risk value will be 
reduced to meet the tolerable criteria. 
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4.3.2.2. SCENARIO 4 (HIGHER TEMPERATURE IN RECONDENSER 
DUE TO MORE BOG INPUT RESULTING FROM FCV-33 
SPURIOUS FULL OPEN. POSSIBLE CAVITATION AND 
DAMAGE OF HP PUMP LEADING TO LEAKAGE) 
 
If the temperature of the recondenser is higher than normal conditions due to 
more BOG input resulting from FCV-33 spurious full open, the unexpected overflowing 
BOG may lead to cavitation of the HP pump. Additionally, it may result in possible 
damage of the pump and leakage of LNG and natural gas.  
The frequency of the spurious full open of a flow control valve (FCV) as an 
initiating event may be estimated with the OREDA data and LNG facility failure data. 
OREDA provides the failure frequency of the fail-to-regulate case of a FCV. The LNG 
failure database gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the 
cryogenic valves. The estimated frequency data (per year) are shown in Figure 4.15. 
Figure 4.15 shows that the posterior value of failure frequency is located between prior 
and likelihood values. The vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% 
Bayesian credible interval ranged from 0.0019/year to 0.0105/year. The detail 
information of these calculations is given in Appendix C. 
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Figure 4.15  Frequency of a spurious full open of a FCV corresponding to Bayesian 
estimation 
 
For this scenario, two IPLs may be considered. One is the high temperature alarm 
and human intervention. The other is the gas detector and human intervention. It is 
assumed that the functions of the temperature alarm and gas detector are independent 
each other, and human intervention can be performed perfectly.  
IPL 1 is the high temperature alarm and human intervention. The PFD of a 
temperature alarm can be estimated with the OREDA data and LNG facility failure data 
base. OREDA provides the failure frequency of a temperature sensor. These data should 
be converted into PFD by using Frequency-PFD conversion method as shown in Figure 
3.8. This method can produce PFD as well as two parameter values of α and β in beta 
distribution. The values of parameters are used as prior information. The LNG failure 
database gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the temperature 
detector. The estimated PFDs of a temperature alarm are shown in Figure 4.16. The 
value is considered as the PFD of the IPL 1 because of the assumption of perfect human 
performance. Figure 4.16 shows that the posterior value of PFD is located between prior 
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and likelihood values. The vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% 
Bayesian credible interval ranged from 0.0001 to 0.0007.  
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Figure 4.16  PFDs of a temperature alarm corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
IPL 2 is the gas detector and human intervention. The PFD of a gas detector can 
be estimated with the OREDA data and LNG facility failure data base. OREDA provides 
the failure frequency of a hydrocarbon gas detector. These data should be converted into 
PFD by using Frequency-PFD conversion method as shown in Figure 3.8. The LNG 
failure database gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of a gas 
detector. The estimated PFDs of a gas detector are shown in Figure 4.17. The value is 
considered as the PFD of the IPL 1 because of the assumption of perfect human 
performance. Figure 4.17 shows that the posterior value of PFD is located between prior 
and likelihood values. The vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% 
Bayesian credible interval ranged from 0.0007 to 0.00012.  
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Figure 4.17  PFDs of a gas detector corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
Consequently, the mitigated failure frequency of scenario 4 can be estimated 
with the LOPA spreadsheet as shown in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8  LOPA spreadsheet of incident scenario 4 
 
Scenario No. 
 
4 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
Higher temperature in recondenser due to more 
BOG input resulting from FCV-33 spurious full open. 
Possible cavitation and damage of HP pump 
leading to leakage. 
Node No. 
 
2 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
LNG level increase and lead to 
carryover into annular space resulting 
in possible overpressure in tank 
    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) FCV-33 spurious full open   5.77E-03 
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.77E-03 
High temperature alarm and human 
intervention 3.34E-04   Independent 
Protection Layers Gas detector and human intervention 9.75E-04     
Total PFD for all IPLs   3.26E-07   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    1.88E-09 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. Gas detector should shut-off the 
BV-32 and BV-23 in case of gas 
detection. 
2. Temperature alarm and gas 
detector should be independent each 
other in order to be considered as an 
IPL respectively. Otherwise, one of 
them cannot be credited fully as an 
IPL. 
3. The test intervals of temperature 
alarm and gas detector should be 
kept 1 month. 
    
Notes       
References       
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The comparison of risk values of scenario 4 is given in Figure 4.18. Figure 4.18 
shows that the posterior value of failure frequency is located between prior and 
likelihood values.  
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Figure 4.18  Risk values of scenario 4 by LOPA 
 
For the risk determination, the estimated posterior risk value, 1.88E-9, can be 
compared to the tolerable criteria, less than 1.00E-5. Thus, risk decision is that scenario 
4 is tolerable if the test intervals and independency between temperature alarm and gas 
detector given in the actions of Table 4.8 will be kept. In order to improve safety more, 
one recommendation may be suggested that gas detector should shut-off the BV-32 and 
BV-23 in case of gas detection to block the LNG input to recondenser. 
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4.3.3. STORAGE TANK (NODE 3) 
 
4.3.3.1. SCENARIO 5 (OVERPRESSURE IN TANK DUE TO ROLLOVER 
RESULTING FROM STRATIFICATION AND DAMAGE OF 
TANK) 
 
If rollover phenomena occur from stratification due to density difference, it may 
make a lot of BOG and lead to overpressure within a LNG storage tank. The 
overpressure may result in the damage of storage tank. Detail information about rollover 
effect is mentioned in Section 1.2.1.  
The frequency of the rollover as an initiating event may be estimated with the 
KGS data [7] and LNG facility failure data base. KGS provides the failure frequency of 
the rollover with mean and standard deviation values. LNG failure data base gives the 
operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the cryogenic storage systems which 
may include the failure data of stratification. The estimated frequency data (per year) are 
shown in Figure 4.19. Figure 4.19 shows that the posterior value of failure frequency is 
between prior and likelihood values. The vertical line of the posterior column indicates 
the 90% Bayesian credible interval ranged from 0.0081/year to 0.0242/year. The detail 
information of these calculations is given in Appendix C. 
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Figure 4.19  Frequency of a rollover corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
For this scenario, three IPLs may be considered. First one is the density 
monitoring and jet mixing. Second one is the high pressure alarm and the trip function of 
ESD valve. Last one is the two pressure valves. It is assumed that the functions of 
density monitoring and pressure alarm are independent each other. 
IPL 1 is the density monitoring and jet mixing with a FCV. The PFD of density 
monitoring systems is given in the KGS data with mean and standard deviation values. 
However, LNG failure data base does not provide the failure data of density monitoring 
systems. Thus, in this case, the PFD from KGS data is used only. In other words, for the 
density monitoring, Bayesian estimation will not be used because there is no plant 
specific data. KGS provides the PFDs of density monitoring systems with a mean value 
of 8.00E-3 and a standard deviation value of 4.00E-3.  
However, IPL 1 consists of the density monitoring and jet mixing with a FCV. 
The PFD of a FCV which controls the jet mixing function should be estimated also. The 
PFD of a FCV can be estimated with the EIReDA data and LNG facility failure data 
base. EIReDA provides the mean value of PFD and parameter values of α and β in beta 
distribution for a FCV. LNG failure data base gives the operating hours, number of 
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failures, and MTBF of the cryogenic valves. The estimated PFDs of an FCV are shown 
in Figure 4.20. The vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian 
credible interval ranged from 0.00023 to 0.00048.  
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Figure 4.20  PFDs of a FCV corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
The failure case of IPL 1 shall be either failure of a density monitoring system or 
a FCV. Thus, if it is assumed that the functions of density monitoring and FCV are 
independent each other, Boolean algebra equation can be used to estimate PFD of IPL 1 
as given in equation 4.1. Therefore, total PFDs of IPL 1 are shown in Figure 4.21. 
 
  
 
110 
PFD comparison of IPL 1
0.00828 0.00834
0.01073
0.00000
0.00200
0.00400
0.00600
0.00800
0.01000
0.01200
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
 
 
Figure 4.21  Total PFDs of the IPL 1 corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
IPL 2 is the high pressure alarm and the trip function of an ESD valve. The PFD 
of a pressure alarm can be estimated with the OREDA data and the LNG facility failure 
database. OREDA provides the failure frequency of a pressure sensor. These data should 
be converted into PFD by using Frequency-PFD conversion method. The LNG failure 
database gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the process control 
system which includes any occurrence which caused a loss of function of the process 
control system. That is, a process control system can include the pressure sensors. Thus, 
the data are used for the likelihood function. The estimated PFDs of a pressure alarm are 
shown in Figure 4.22. The vertical line of posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian 
credible interval ranged from 0.0011 to 0.0034.  
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Figure 4.22  PFDs of a pressure alarm corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
However, IPL 2 consists of the pressure alarm and an ESD valve. The PFD of 
ESD valve should be estimated also. The PFD of an ESV can be estimated with the 
EIReDA data and LNG facility failure database. EIReDA provides the mean value of 
PFD and parameter values of α and β in beta distribution for an ESV. LNG failure data 
base gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the cryogenic valves. 
The estimated PFDs of an ESD valve are shown in Figure 4.23. The vertical line of the 
posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval ranged from 0.0010 to 
0.0018.  
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Figure 4.23  PFDs of an ESD valve corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
The failure case of IPL 2 shall be either failure of a high pressure alarm or an 
ESV. Thus, if it is assumed that pressure alarm and ESV are independent each other, the 
Boolean algebra equation can be used to estimate PFD of IPL 2 as given in equation 4.1. 
Therefore, total PFDs of IPL 2 are shown in Figure 4.24. 
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Figure 4.24  Total PFDs of the IPL 2 corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
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IPL 3 is two pressure relief valves (PRV). The PFD of a PRV can be estimated 
with the EIReDA data and the LNG facility failure database. EIReDA provides the mean 
value of PFD and parameter values of α and β in beta distribution for a PRV. The LNG 
failure database gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the 
cryogenic valves. The estimated PFDs of a PRV are shown in Figure 4.25. The vertical 
line of the posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval ranged from 
0.0004 to 0.0007. 
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Figure 4.25  PFDs of a PRV corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
 If two PRVs are installed to a storage tank and it is assumed that one PRV 
has the sufficient relief capacity of all possible overpressures, then the benefit of two 
valves should be considered to estimate the PFD of IPL 2. However, if the valves are the 
same type, common cause factor (β) should be considered. As mentioned in Section 3.5, 
the average PFD of 1oo2 voting multiple systems is  
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 According to expert judgments, β factor for valves with a common pipe 
connection to a storage tank may be 30% because valves are connected to a shared 
pipeline which may contribute the common cause failures of them. However, β factor for 
valves with independent pipelines to a storage tank may be 0.1% much less than the case 
with a common pipeline. By plugging the value of β factor and PFD as shown in Figure 
4.25, PFD of two PRVs with a common pipeline and with independent pipe connections 
to a storage tank is given in Figures 4.26 and 4.27, respectively. 
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Figure 4.26  Total PFDs of the IPL 3 with a common pipeline corresponding to 
Bayesian estimation 
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PFD comparison of two PRVs with independent pipes
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Figure 4.27  Total PFDs of the IPL 3 with independent pipelines corresponding to 
Bayesian estimation 
 
Consequently, the mitigated failure frequency of scenario 5 can be estimated 
with the LOPA spreadsheet as shown in Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.9  LOPA spreadsheet of incident scenario 5 
 
Scenario No. 
 
5 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
Overpressure in tank due to rollover resulting from 
stratification and possible damage in tank 
Node No. 
 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Overpressure in tank and possible 
damage     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) Rollover due to stratification   1.50E-02 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    1.50E-02 
Density monitoring and jet 
mixing(FCV) 8.34E-03   
High pressure alarm and trip inlet line 
valve(EMOV) 3.46E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
Two pressure relief valves 1.58E-04   
Total PFD for all IPLs   4.56E-09   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    6.86E-11 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. If each PRV has its own pipeline 
connection to a storage tank to be 
independent each other, the PFD of 
two PRVs can be reduced. 
2. The logic solver of density 
monitoring and pressure alarm should 
be independent to get full credits of 
IPLs. Otherwise, one of them cannot 
be an IPL. 
    
Notes       
References       
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The comparison of risk values of scenario 5 is given in Figure 4.28. Figure 4.28 
shows that the posterior value of failure frequency is located between prior and 
likelihood values.  
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Figure 4.28  Risk values of scenario 5 by LOPA 
 
For the risk determination, the estimated posterior risk value, 6.12E-11, can be 
compared to the tolerable criteria, less than 1.00E-5. Thus, the risk decision is that 
scenario 5 is tolerable if the test intervals and independency between density monitoring 
and pressure alarm given in the actions of Table 4.9 will be kept. In order to improve 
safety more, one recommendation may be suggested that each PRV has an independent 
pipeline connection to a storage tank to minimize the common cause factor. 
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4.3.3.2. SCENARIO 6 (LNG LEVEL INCREASES AND LEADS TO 
CARRYOVER INTO ANNULAR SPACE BECAUSE OPERATOR 
LINES UP THE WRONG TANK. POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURE IN 
TANK) 
 
If operators line up the wrong tank which is already filled with a high level of 
LNG, it may result in level increase and then carryover into the annular space of LNG. 
Additionally, this may also result in overpressure and possible damage of the tank.  
The frequency of operator errors is not provided in generic data sources. In this 
case, Jeffreys noninformative prior may be used to update the plant specific data. It is 
assumed that the prior follows the gamma distribution with parameter α is equal to 0.5 
and β is zero. As a likelihood function, the LNG failure database gives the operating 
hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the human errors. The estimated frequency data 
(per year) are shown in Figure 4.29. Figure 4.29 shows that the posterior value of failure 
frequency is a little larger than the likelihood value after updating. The vertical line of 
the posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval ranged from 
0.0240/year to 0.0504/year. The detail information of these calculations is given in 
Appendix C. 
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Figure 4.29  Frequency of human errors corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
For this scenario, two IPLs may be considered. One is the two independent level 
alarms and human intervention. The other is the two high-high level detectors and an 
ESD valve. It is assumed that the functions of level detector and alarms are independent 
each other. 
IPL 1 is two independent level alarms and human intervention. In this case, it is 
not assumed that human performance is perfect because the storage tank may have high 
severity and also human error data are available. OREDA provides the failure frequency 
of a level alarm. These data should be converted into PFD by using Frequency-PFD 
conversion method. The LNG failure database gives the operating hours, number of 
failures, and MTBF of the process control system which can include level sensors. Thus, 
the data are used as the likelihood function. The estimated PFDs of a level alarm are 
shown in Figure 4.30. The vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% 
Bayesian credible interval ranged from 0.0140 to 0.0354.  
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Figure 4.30  PFDs of a level alarm corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
A modification to this scenario would be to have two level alarms installed to a 
storage tank. If the valves are same types, common cause factor (β) should be considered. 
According to Section 3.5, the average PFD of 1oo2 voting level alarm systems can be 
calculated. In this case, β factor for level alarms may be assumed to 5% according to 
expert judgments. By plugging the value of β factor and PFD as shown in Figure 4.30, 
the PFD of two level alarms is given in Figure 4.31. 
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Figure 4.31  Total PFDs of the two level alarms considering common cause factor 
corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
However, IPL 1 consists of two level alarms and human intervention. The PFD 
of human intervention should be estimated. KGS provides the probability data in the 
case that an operator fails to shutdown on high level alarm with a mean of 8.00E-4 and 
standard deviation of 1.30E-3.  
The failure case of IPL 1 shall be either failure of two level alarms or human 
intervention. Thus, the Boolean algebra equation can be used to estimate the PFD of IPL 
1 as given in equation 4.1. Therefore, total PFDs of IPL 1 are shown in Figure 4.32. 
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Figure 4.32  Total PFDs of the IPL 1 corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
IPL 2 is the two high-high level detectors and an ESD valve. The PFD of a level 
detector can be estimated with the OREDA data and LNG facility failure database. 
OREDA provides the failure frequency of a level sensor. These data should be converted 
into PFD by using Frequency-PFD conversion method. The LNG failure database gives 
the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the process control system. Thus, 
the data are used as the likelihood function. The estimated PFDs of a level detector are 
shown in Figure 4.33. The vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% 
Bayesian credible interval ranged from 0.0140 to 0.0354.  
  
 
123 
PFD comparison
0.0201
0.0239
0.0259
0.0000
0.0050
0.0100
0.0150
0.0200
0.0250
0.0300
0.0350
0.0400
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
 
 
Figure 4.33  PFDs of a level detector corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
In this case, two independent level detectors are installed to a storage tank. If the 
valves are same types, common cause factor (β) should be considered. According to 
Section 3.5, the average PFD of 1oo2 voting level detectors can be calculated. In this 
case, β factor for level alarms may be assumed to 5% according to expert judgments. By 
plugging the value of β factor and PFD as shown in Figure 4.33, the PFDs of two level 
alarms is given in Figure 4.34. 
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Figure 4.34  Total PFDs of the two level detectors considering common cause factor 
corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
However, IPL 2 consists of two level detectors and an ESD valve. The PFD of an 
ESD valve should be estimated. The PFD of an ESV can be estimated with the EIReDA 
data and LNG facility failure database. EIReDA provides the mean value of PFD and 
parameter values of α and β in beta distribution for an ESV. The LNG failure data base 
gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the cryogenic valves. The 
estimated PFDs of an ESD valve are shown in Figure 4.35. The vertical line of the 
posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval ranged from 0.0010 to 
0.0018.  
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Figure 4.35  PFDs of an ESD valve corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
The failure case of IPL 2 shall be either failure of two high-high level detectors 
or an ESV. Thus, if it is assumed that level detectors and ESV is independent each other, 
Boolean algebra equation can be used to estimate PFD of IPL 2 as given in equation 4.1. 
Therefore, total PFDs of IPL 2 are shown in Figure 4.36. 
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Figure 4.36  Total PFDs of the IPL 2 corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
Consequently, the mitigated failure frequency of scenario 6 can be estimated 
with the LOPA spreadsheet as shown in Table 4.10. 
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Table 4.10  LOPA spreadsheet of incident scenario 6 
 
Scenario No. 
 
6 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
LNG level increases and leads to carryover into 
annular space of LNG because operator lines up the 
wrong tank. Possible overpressure in tank. 
Node No. 
 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
LNG level increases and leads to 
carryover into annular space resulting 
in possible overpressure in tank 
    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
Human errors (operator lines up the 
wrong tank)   3.53E-02 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
N/A     Conditional modifiers 
(if applicable) N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    3.53E-02 
Two independent level alarms and 
human intervention 2.57E-03   Independent 
Protection Layers Two high-high level detector and ESD 
of BV-40  
3.10E-03 
  
  
  
Total PFD for all IPLs   7.94E-06   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    2.80E-07 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. The test intervals of level alarm 
and detector should be kept 1 year 
and BV should have 1 month test 
interval. 
2. Level alarms and detectors should 
be independent each other in order to 
keep the risk value. 
    
Notes       
References       
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The comparison of risk values of scenario 6 is given in Figure 4.37. Figure 4.37 
shows that the posterior value of failure frequency is a little less than likelihood value, 
and prior value is not shown because Jeffreys noninformative prior is used. 
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Figure 4.37  Risk values of scenario 6 by LOPA 
 
For the risk determination, the estimated posterior risk value, 2.80E-7, can be 
compared to the tolerable criteria, less than 1.00E-5. Thus, risk decision is that scenario 
6 is tolerable if the test intervals and independency between level alarms and detectors 
given in the actions of Table 4.10 will be kept. 
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4.3.3.3. SCENARIO 7 (UNDERPRESSURE IN TANK DUE TO PUMP-
OUT WITHOUT BOG INPUT RESULTING FROM BV-45 FAILED 
CLOSURE. DAMAGE OF TANK) 
 
If the BV-45 spuriously trips to close during pumping out of LNG by LP pumps 
and results in BOG input stop, it may cause possible underpressure within a tank. The 
underpressure may result in the damage of the storage tank.  
The frequency of the spurious trip to close of a block valve as an initiating event 
may be estimated with the OREDA data and LNG facility failure database. OREDA 
provides the failure frequency of a spurious operation of a shut-off valve. It is used for 
prior information as generic data in Bayesian estimation. The LNG failure data base 
gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the cryogenic valves which 
can be used as likelihood information of plant specific data. The estimated frequency 
data (per year) are shown in Figure 4.38. Figure 4.38 shows that the posterior value of 
failure frequency is located between prior and likelihood values. The vertical line of the 
posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval ranged from 0.0019/year 
to 0.0099/year. The detail information of these calculations is given in Appendix C. 
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Figure 4.38  Frequency of a spurious trip to close of a block valve corresponding to 
Bayesian estimation 
 
For this scenario, three IPLs may be considered. First, is the low pressure alarm 
and BOG compressor trip. Second, is the low-low pressure detector and LP pump trip. 
The last IPL is the two vacuum relief valves. It is assumed that the functions of the 
pressure alarm and pressure compressors or pumps are independent each other. 
IPL 1 is the low pressure alarm and BOG compressor trip. The PFD of a pressure 
alarm can be estimated with the OREDA data and LNG facility failure database. 
OREDA provides the failure frequency of a pressure sensor. These data should be 
converted into PFD by using Frequency-PFD conversion method. The LNG failure data 
base gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the process control 
system which includes any occurrence which caused a loss of function of the process 
control system. That is, process control system can include the pressure sensors. Thus, 
the data are used as the likelihood function. The estimated PFDs of a pressure alarm are 
shown in Figure 4.39. The vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% 
Bayesian credible interval ranged from 0.0011 to 0.0034.  
 
  
 
131 
PFD comparison
0.00210.00220.0018
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
0.0030
0.0035
0.0040
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
 
 
Figure 4.39  PFDs of a pressure alarm corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
However, IPL 1 consists of the pressure alarm and compressor trip. The PFD of a 
compressor should be estimated to find out the PFD of IPL 1. The PFD of a compressor 
can be estimated with the EIReDA data and LNG facility failure database. EIReDA 
provides the mean value of PFD and parameter values of α and β in beta distribution for 
a compressor. The LNG failure database gives the operating hours, number of failures, 
and MTBF of compressors. The estimated PFDs of a BOG compressor are shown in 
Figure 4.40. The vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian 
credible interval ranged from 0.0025 to 0.0033. 
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Figure 4.40  PFDs of a compressor corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
The failure case of IPL 1 shall be either failure of a low pressure alarm or a BOG 
compressor. If it is assumed that the functions of a pressure alarm and a compressor are 
independent each other, the Boolean algebra equation can be used to estimate PFDs of 
IPL 1 as given in equation 4.1. Therefore, total PFDs of IPL 1 are shown in Figure 4.41. 
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Figure 4.41  Total PFDs of IPL 1 corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
  
 
133 
IPL 2 is the low-low pressure detector and LP pump trip. The PFD of a pressure 
sensor can be estimated with the OREDA data and LNG facility failure database. 
OREDA provides the failure frequency of a pressure sensor. These data should be 
converted into PFD by using Frequency-PFD conversion method. The LNG failure 
database gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the process control 
system which includes any occurrence which caused a loss of function of the process 
control system. The estimated PFDs of a pressure detector are shown in Figure 4.42. The 
vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval ranged 
from 0.0011 to 0.0034.  
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Figure 4.42  PFDs of a pressure detector corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
However, IPL 2 consists of the pressure detector and LP pump trip. The PFD of a 
pump should be estimated also to find out the PFD of IPL 2. The PFD of a pump can be 
estimated with the EIReDA data and LNG facility failure database. EIReDA provides 
the mean value of PFD and parameter values of α and β in beta distribution for a pump. 
The LNG failure database gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of 
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cryogenic pumps. The estimated PFDs of a BOG compressor are shown in Figure 4.43. 
The vertical line of the posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval 
ranged from 0.0002 to 0.0005.  
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Figure 4.43  PFDs of a compressor corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
The failure case of IPL 2 shall be either failure of a low-low pressure detector or 
a LP pump. Thus, if it is assumed that the functions of a pressure detector and a pump 
are independent each other, the Boolean algebra equation can be used to estimate PFDs 
of IPL 2 as given in equation 4.1. Therefore, total PFDs of IPL 2 are shown in Figure 
4.44. 
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Figure 4.44  Total PFDs of IPL 2 corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
IPL 3 is two vacuum relief valves (VRV). The PFD of a VRV can be estimated 
with the EIReDA data and LNG facility failure data base. Specific data on the failure 
rate of aVRV are not specified in generic data sources. However, VRVs are essentially 
pressure relief valves (PRVs), except operating in underpressure, not in overpressure. 
Thus, the failure data of a PRV are used to get PFD of a VRV. EIReDA provides the 
mean value of PFD and parameter values of α and β in beta distribution for a PRV. LNG 
failure data base gives the operating hours, number of failures, and MTBF of the 
cryogenic valves. The estimated PFDs of a VRV are shown in Figure 4.45. The vertical 
line of posterior column indicates the 90% Bayesian credible interval ranged from 
0.0004 to 0.0007. 
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Figure 4.45  PFDs of a VRV corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
By the way, two VRVs are installed to a storage tank. If it is assumed that one 
VRV has the sufficient relief capacity of all possible cases of underpressure, the benefit 
of two valves should be considered to estimate PFD of IPL 3. However, if the valves are 
the same type, common cause factor (β) should be considered. According to Section 3.5, 
the average PFD of 1oo2 voting VRVs can be calculated. In this case, β factor for valves 
may be assumed to 0.1% according to expert judgments. By plugging the value of β 
factor and PFD as shown in Figure 4.45, the PFD of two VRVs is given in Figure 4.46. 
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Figure 4.46  Total PFDs of the IPL 3 corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
 
Consequently, the mitigated failure frequency of scenario 7 can be estimated 
with the LOPA spreadsheet as shown in Table 4.11. 
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Table 4.11  LOPA spreadsheet of incident scenario 7 
 
Scenario No. 
 
7 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
Underpressure in tank due to pump-out without 
BOG input resulting from BV-45 failed closure. 
Possible damage of tank 
Node No. 
 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Underpressure in tank and possible 
damage of tank     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
LP pump-out without BOG input due 
to BV-25 spurious failed closure   5.51E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.51E-03 
Low pressure alarm and BOG 
compressor trip 5.01E-03   
Low-low pressure detector and LP 
pump trip 2.48E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
Two vacuum relief valves 8.02E-07   
Total PFD for all IPLs   9.98E-12   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    5.50E-14 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. The logic solver of pressure alarm 
and detector should be independent 
to get full credits of IPLs. Otherwise, 
one of them cannot be an IPL. 
    
Notes 
For two vacuum relief valves, 
common cause factors were 
considered, but the PFD of them is 
still very small because the common 
cause factor is only 0.1% according 
to expert judgments. 
    
References       
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The comparison of risk values of scenario 7 is given in Figure 4.47. Figure 4.47 
shows that the posterior value of failure frequency is located between prior and 
likelihood values.  
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Figure 4.47  Risk values of scenario 7 by LOPA 
 
For the risk determination, the estimated posterior risk value, 5.50E-14, can be 
compared to the tolerable criteria, less than 1.00E-5. Thus, the risk decision is that 
scenario 7 is tolerable if the test intervals and independency between pressure alarm and 
detector given in the actions of Table 4.11 will be kept.  
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4.4. VALIDATION OF RESULTS 
 
Using the Bayesian estimation means that updated posterior values will be 
obtained with prior and likelihood data. In other words, posterior values should exist 
between the prior and likelihood data in case of using informative prior.  
As shown in Section 4.3, all posterior values are located between prior and 
likelihood values. It indicates that posterior values reflect both generic data as prior 
information and LNG plant specific data as a likelihood function. For example, the 
posterior mean value of failure frequency of a pressure alarm as shown in Figure 4.48, 
which is addressed already in Section 4.3, is located between mean values of prior and 
likelihood data. It indicates that the posterior value is updated correctly. Therefore, a 
conclusion can be made that all posterior values of each item mentioned in Section 4.3 
are reasonable and valid. 
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Figure 4.48  PFDs of a pressure alarm corresponding to Bayesian estimation 
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However, the above conclusion is not always true to the final frequency values of 
incident scenarios estimated by LOPA methodology. The frequency values are obtained 
by multiplying the failure frequency of an initiating event and PFDs of IPLs as shown in 
equation 2-1. In some cases as shown in Figure 4.49, the posterior value of failure 
frequency of a incident scenario is located between prior and likelihood values because 
the failure frequency of an initiating event and PFDs of all IPLs as shown in Figures 
4.19, 4.20, 4.22, 4.23 and 4.25 have the same data trend among prior, likelihood, and 
posterior values. 
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Figure 4.49  Risk values of scenario 5 by LOPA 
 
However, this trend is not always followed to all risk values for incidents 
estimated by LOPA. If an initiating event or some IPLs have different trends than each 
other, the posterior values of risks may not exist between prior and likelihood values. In 
other words, some scenarios may have ascending or descending trends among prior, 
likelihood, and posterior values. For example, the failure frequency of an initiating event 
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as shown in Figure 4.50 and the PFD of IPL 2 as shown in Figure 4.52, respectively, 
have the same data trend among prior, likelihood and posterior values. However, the 
PFD of IPL 1 as shown in Figure 4.51 has the opposite trend with others. Even though 
all posterior values of an initiating event and IPLs exist between the prior and likelihood 
values, the posterior frequency of an incident scenario estimated by Bayesian-LOPA as 
shown in Figure 4.53 is not located between the prior and likelihood data. The failure 
data of Figures 4.50 to 4.53 are just examples to show the cases which do not follow the 
norm. 
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Figure 4.50  Failure frequency of an initiating event (Example only) 
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PFD of IPL 1 (Example)
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Figure 4.51  PFD of IPL 1 (Example only) 
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Figure 4.52  PFD of IPL 2 (Example only) 
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Figure 4.53  Failure frequency of an incident scenario (Example only) 
 
In conclusion, all posterior values of initiating events or PFDs of IPLs are always 
located between prior and likelihood data in the case of using informative prior 
distribution. The posterior values of incident scenarios estimated by Bayesian-LOPA 
methodology may exist between the prior and likelihood values only if the failure 
frequencies of initiating events and PFDs of IPLs have the same data trend among prior, 
likelihood, and posterior values. Otherwise, posterior values of some incident scenarios 
may not be located between the prior and likelihood values. 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1. SUMMARY 
 
LNG is one of the fastest growing energy sources in the U.S. to fulfill the 
increasing energy demands and diversify the energy portfolio. In order to meet the 
growing demands of LNG, many LNG facilities including LNG importation terminals 
are operating currently. Moreover, there are many proposed projects concerning LNG 
importation terminals to fill the gap between supply and demand of LNG in North 
America. Therefore, it is very important to control and estimate the latent risks in LNG 
terminals to keep them safe.  
One of the most cost effective ways to estimate the risk is LOPA because it can 
provide quantified risk results with less time and efforts than other methods. Thus, 
LOPA was applied in this research. For the LOPA application, failure data are essential 
to compute risk frequencies. However, the failure data from the LNG industry are very 
sparse and have statistically shaky grounds due to insufficient sample data and relatively 
short-term operational history. Bayesian estimation is identified as one of the better 
methods to use to compensate for the weaknesses found in the LNG industry’s failure 
data. It can update the generic data with plant specific data. That is to say, the data 
updated by Bayesian logic can reflect both long-term based historical experiences from 
generic data and plant specific conditions from plant specific data.  
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Thus, in this research, the new Bayesian-LOPA methodology was developed, and 
it was applied to an LNG importation terminal to estimate the potential risks. Finally, by 
the method, risk determinations and risk ranking were made to several incident scenarios 
and some recommendations for safety enhancement were suggested. 
 By the HAZOP study done by a team, seven possible incident scenarios were 
identified in an LNG terminal. The failure frequencies of initiating events and PFDs of 
IPLs were estimated using Bayesian estimation. The Bayesian-LOPA methodology 
provided the quantified risk values of the incident scenarios. By comparing to the risk 
criteria given by CCPS, risk decisions were made for the scenarios.  
In view of probabilistic risk assessment, risk ranking among incident scenarios 
was decided to provide priority of additional safety measures. Moreover, in order to 
improve the safety, some recommendations were suggested. Table 5.1 shows the 
summary of the risk values, risk ranking, risk determinations, and recommendations. 
Additionally, Figure 5.1 shows risk value graphs of seven incident scenarios comparing 
to prior, likelihood, and Bayesian posterior values. 
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Table 5.1  The risk summary of incident scenarios 
 
No. of 
scenario Scenarios 
Failure 
frequency 
(/year) 
Risk 
ranking 
Criteria 
met? Recommendations 
1 
LNG leakage from 
Loading arms during 
unloading 
9.87E-08 4 YES 
1. Gas detector and fire 
detector should be 
independent each other in 
order to be considered as an 
IPL, respectively.  
2. The test intervals of gas and 
fire detectors should be kept 1 
month. 
2 
Pressure increase of 
unloading arm due to 
BV-45 failed closure 
during unloading 
2.90E-06 2 YES 
1. A PSV may be installed 
before TSV, unless TSV can 
operate as a PSV in case of 
overpressure. 
3 
HP pump cavitation and 
damage due to low 
pressure of recondenser 
resulting from BV-32 
failed closure. Possible 
leakage and fire. 
1.37E-05 1 NO 
1. HP pump should be tripped 
in case of low-low level of 
recondenser 
2. It is better to have HP pump 
of auto circulation type to 
control the pump out and 
prevent cavitation. 
3. The test intervals of 
pressure alarm and HP pump 
should be kept 1 month, 
respectively. 
4 
Higher temperature in 
recondenser due to 
more BOG input 
resulting from FCV-33 
spurious full open. 
Possible cavitation and 
damage of HP pump 
leading to leakage. 
1.88E-09 5 YES 
1. Gas detector should shut-off 
the BV-32 and BV-23 in case 
of gas detection. 
2. Temperature alarm and gas 
detector should be 
independent each other in 
order to be considered as an 
IPL respectively. 3. The test 
intervals of temperature alarm 
and gas detector should be 
kept 1 month. 
5 
Overpressure in tank 
due to rollover resulting 
from stratification and 
possible damage of tank 
6.86E-11 6 YES 
1. If each PRV has its own 
pipeline connection to a 
storage tank to be independent 
of each other, the PFD of two 
PRVs can be reduced. 
2. The logic solver of density 
monitoring and pressure alarm 
should be independent to get 
full credits of IPLs. 
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Table 5.1  Continued 
 
No. of 
scenario Scenarios 
Failure 
frequency 
(/year) 
Risk 
ranking 
Criteria 
met? Recommendations 
6 
LNG level increase and 
lead to carryover into 
annular space of LNG 
because operator lines 
up the wrong tank. 
Possible overpressure 
in tank. 
2.80E-07 3 YES 
1. The test intervals of level 
alarm and detector should be 
kept 1 year and BV should 
have 1 month test interval. 
2. Level alarms and detectors 
should be independent of each 
other in order to keep the risk 
value. 
7 
Underpressure in tank 
due to pump-out 
without BOG input 
resulting from BV-45 
failed closure. Possible 
damage of tank 
5.50E-14 7 YES 
1. The logic solver of pressure 
alarm and detector should be 
independent to get full credits 
of IPLs. Otherwise, one of 
them cannot be an IPL. 
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Comparison of scenario risk
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Figure 5.1  The risk value graphs of seven incident scenarios 
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5.2. CONCLUSION 
 
Bayesian-LOPA methodology was developed to use for risk assessments in this 
research and it produced valid results of risk determination as shown in Table 5.1. In 
order to apply the methodology to a LNG importation terminal, HAZOP study was 
conducted at first by a team and it identified potential hazards. The HAZOP results were 
used to make possible incident scenarios by a combination with initiating events and 
consequences for LOPA application. The generic failure data and LNG plant specific 
data were gathered to be used as prior and likelihood information.  
Based on Bayesian estimation, the frequencies of initiating events were obtained 
using a conjugate gamma distribution as the prior information and Poisson distribution 
as likelihood function. OREDA database was used for a prior distribution because it was 
produced from a gamma distribution. If there is no prior information, Jeffreys 
noninformative prior may be used. LNG plant failure data base was used as plant 
specific likelihood information. The PFDs of IPLs were estimated with conjugate beta 
prior distribution and binomial likelihood distribution. EIReDA data book was used for 
prior information because it provided the failure data made by beta distribution. In some 
cases EIReDA did not provide failure data in some cases, the newly developed 
Frequency-PFD conversion method was used instead. By the combination of Bayesian 
estimation and LOPA procedures, the Bayesian-LOPA methodology was developed. The 
method was applied to an LNG importation terminal. For seven incident scenarios, it can 
produce the valid risk values of all scenarios. The posterior values of every initiating 
event or IPL are located between prior and likelihood values. This means that the 
posterior values are valid and well-updated. However, the fact is not always true to the 
risk values of incident scenarios estimated by LOPA method. If the frequency data of an 
initiating event and PFDs of IPLs have different data trend among prior, likelihood, and 
posterior values, the fact may not be true. 
The found risk values were compared to tolerable risk criteria to make risk 
decisions. All scenarios excluding scenario 3 could meet the criteria. For Scenario 3, 
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which is related to HP pump cavitation damage, some recommendations were suggested 
to reduce the risk. For other scenarios, some recommendations were also given to 
improve the safety. Finally, the estimated risk values of seven incident scenarios were 
compared to each other to make a risk ranking in view of probabilistic risk analysis 
which considers only failure frequency without considering consequence analysis. 
In conclusion, the newly developed Bayesian-LOPA methodology as one of the 
risk assessment methods really does work well in an LNG importation terminal and it 
can be applied in other industries including refineries, petrochemicals, nuclear plants, 
and space industries. Moreover, it can be used with other frequency analysis methods 
such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA). 
As the good safety records of LNG industries speak, in this research, it can be 
generally concluded that the LNG terminal has very good safety protections to prevent 
dangerous events. However, some parts such as HP pump area have not sufficient 
safeguards. Thus, suggested recommendations should be applied. By the way, careful 
caution should be taken that the estimated results are only based on the information 
which is available to public, so the results or recommendations may not reflect 
completely on a real LNG terminal. Therefore, this research must not be used for legal 
activities. 
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5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
 
The Bayesian-LOPA methodology can produce more reliable estimated risk 
values than the normal LOPA method. Moreover, the developed method can also 
provide the credible intervals of failure frequencies or probabilities to show uncertainties. 
However, it cannot produce credible intervals of final risk values for incident scenarios 
and IPLs which are composed of multiple components. In order to obtain credible 
intervals, it is necessary to find the distribution products and summations since the final 
risk values of incident scenarios are computed by multiplication of gamma distribution 
and beta distribution (s); and the PFDs of multi-component IPLs are calculated by the 
multiplication and summation with Boolean algebra. The final credible intervals for 
incident scenarios can be used to show the uncertainties of estimated values. 
Sometimes, initiating events can occur with several basic events. For example, 
suppose that an initiating event is the failure of unloading arms. Unloading arms consist 
of pipe, flanges with gaskets, swivel joints and valves. The failure rate of the loading 
arm should be composed of the failure rates of each component. In this case, in order to 
find out loading arm failure rate, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA) can be used. Therefore, Bayesian-LOPA methodology can be combined with 
FTA or ETA to get more reliable initiating event frequencies. 
LOPA can be used to determine the sufficiency of Safety Instrumented System 
(SIS) of facilities or plants. Typically, SIS, which is one of the IPLs, consists of sensors, 
logic solvers, and final elements such as valves. Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is used to 
show the reliability of SIS. Thus, SIL verification will be required to obtain the failure 
rate of SIS. In this research, the SIL verification was not fully conducted because of 
insufficient reliability data. However, SIL verification may be considered to estimate the 
risks more accurately by LOPA. Thus, SIL verification can be associated with the 
Bayesian-LOPA methodology. 
Currently, in this research, Microsoft Excel software was used to compute the 
failure data in the Bayesian-LOPA estimation. However, it is not a fully automatic 
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calculation because some information should be handled manually. Thus, computer-
aided Bayesian-LOPA methodology can be developed so that results and graphs are 
produced automatically. In the future, a specific program may be developed for the 
Bayesian-LOPA method. 
Finally, in the current LOPA method, only independent protection layers can be 
considered as IPLs to reduce the risk. However, in the industries, some protection layers 
or safeguards can be dependent to each other. These dependent layers should be credited 
for risk assessments to some extent, respectively. Therefore, dependency-based LOPA 
methodology should be developed to make up the weakness. 
Summarized below are potential areas for future: 
 Obtaining the credible intervals of incident scenarios and multi-component IPLs 
 Combining the Bayesian-LOPA methodology with FTA or ETA for the more 
reliable frequencies of initiating events 
 Conducting SIL verification with Bayesian-LOPA methodology 
 Developing the computer-aided Bayesian-LOPA methodology 
 Developing dependency-based LOPA methodology 
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APPENDIX A.   PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM AND P&IDs 
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APPENDIX B.   HAZOP SPREADSHEETS 
 
Node List 
 
Node Description/design intent Design conditions/parameters 
1. LNG liquid unloads from 
ship to tank 
LNG unloads from tanker (ship) to a storage 
tank 
A shutdown valve is provided at the 
unloading arm 
2. LP LNG pump discharge to 
recondenser & HP pump 
suction 
LP LNG pump feeds LNG to HP LNG pump 
to boost. This LNG is passed through 
recondenser to condense BOG. 
LP pump is provided in each tank to 
supply LNG to HP pump which boosts 
this liquid to higher pressure. 
3. LNG tank system LNG is stored in this tank and then sent 
through recondenser to vaporizer. 
The Pressure of a tank is almost 
atmospheric pressure and insulation is 
provided to keep LNG cool. 
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Node 1  LNG liquid unloading from ship to tank 
 
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards 
Severity-
Probability 
(H, M, L) 
Actions 
Final 
severity-
Probability 
(H, M, L) 
No flow BV-1 closure at the jetty 
Pressure increase of unloading 
arm and jetty piping up to ship 
pump shut-off pressure or 
higher pressure due to surge 
conditions 
1.Arm and piping were 
designed to bear this pressure 
2.One TSV along the transfer 
line 
3.Valve closing time is based 
on surge analysis 
L-L 
A PSV before 
TSV may be 
installed, 
unless TSV 
can operate as 
a PSV as well 
as a TSV. 
L-L 
No flow Manual valve close due to human error 
Pressure increase of unloading 
arm and jetty piping up to ship 
pump shut-off pressure or 
higher pressure due to surge 
conditions 
1.Arm and piping were 
designed to bear this pressure L-L 
operation 
procedure L-L 
More flow Higher ship pump 
capacity Possible overpressure in tank 
PCV to flare and PSV to flare 
on tank to discharge any 
excess vapors 
L-L 
A flow meter 
added and 
connected to 
PCV 
L-L 
Higher 
temperature 
Blocked condition in 
LNG transfer line 
results in more 
temperature, heat 
leak and thermal 
expansion 
Possible overpressure in line TSV along the transfer line L-L   L-L 
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Node 1  Continued 
 
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards 
Severity-
Probability 
(H, M, L) 
Actions 
Final 
severity-
Probability 
(H, M, L) 
Higher 
pressure 
Blocked condition 
during unloading 
Possible overpressure up to 
shut off pressure of ship pump 
Piping designed to bear this 
pressure L-L   L-L 
Misdirected 
flow 
Wrong tank lined-up 
for unloading 
High level of tank may be 
reached quicker than normal 
due to inadvertent lined-up. 
Overfilling of tank may be 
possible 
1. High level alarm and high-
high level trip of inlet to tank 
2.Operation procedure to trip 
the ship pump by human 
intervention 
3. automatic diversion systems 
among tanks 
H-L   H-L 
Start up 
hazard 
Operator fails to 
cool-down unloading 
arms and directly 
start unloading 
Thermal shock on unloading 
arms and piping may be 
possible and lead to potential 
leakage from joints 
Unloading operating 
procedures require cool-down 
before unloading 
M-L 
1. very 
experienced 
operators with 
quality 
training 
M-L 
Transfer 
operation 
hazards 
Loading arm failure 
and leakage (swivel 
joints failure, flange 
joints failures) 
Possible leakage, vapor cloud, 
ignition, and fire 
1. Excess movement detectors 
which will initiate shutdown 
and disconnection 
2. N2 connection to swivel 
joints 
3. Gas detectors at the jetty 
4. Fire detectors at the jetty 
which will initiate shutdown 
M-L   M-L 
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Node 2  LP LNG pump discharge to recondenser & HP pump suction 
 
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards 
Severity-
Probability 
(H, M, L) 
Actions 
Final 
severity-
Probability 
(H, M, L) 
No flow 
No flow LP LNG 
pump discharge due 
to closure of BV-32 
or FCV-20 
The suction pressure of HP 
pump may decrease leading to 
cavitation and damage to pump. 
Possible leakage, vapor cloud, 
ignition, and fire due to HP 
pump failure 
1.Low pressure alarm at HP 
pump suction 
2.Opearating procedure (i.e. 
LP pump more running than 
HP pump) 
M-L 
1. It is better 
that the HP 
pump is auto 
circulation 
type. 
2.HP pump 
should be trip 
in case of low-
low level of 
recondenser 
3.check the 
number of 
pumps 
(redundancy) 
4.One PSV 
installed after 
HP pump 
L-L 
More flow More flow due to FCV-20 full open 
Level build-up in recondenser 
leading to LNG carryover to 
BOG header 
1.High level alarm 
2.High-high level alarm, LIA-
2 HH will close BV-32 of LP 
LNG inlet and BV-21 of HP 
pump kickback line. 
L-L 
1. 
independency 
among alarms 
  
L-L 
Lower 
temperature No issue         
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Node 2  Continued 
 
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards 
Severity-
Probability 
(H, M, L) 
Actions 
Final 
severity-
Probability 
(H, M, L) 
Higher 
temperature 
More flow from 
BOG due to FCV-33 
full open in the 
recondenser inlet 
Lots of BOG leads to cooling 
failure in recondenser and result 
in LNG temperature increase of 
HP pump suction leading to 
cavitation and damage to pump. 
Possible leakage, vapor cloud, 
ignition, and fire due to HP 
pump failure 
1.High temperature alarm 
along the suction line of HP 
pump. 
2.Gas detector 
M-L   M-L 
Lower 
pressure 
No flow LP LNG 
pump discharge due 
to closure of FCV-
20 
The suction pressure of HP 
pump may decrease leading to 
cavitation and damage to pump. 
Possible leakage, vapor cloud, 
ignition, and fire due to HP 
pump failure 
1.Low pressure alarm at HP 
pump suction 
2.Opearating procedure (i.e. 
LP pump more running than 
HP pump) 
M-L   
  
M-L 
Higher 
pressure 
More flow of BOG 
due to FCV-33 full 
open in the BOG 
inlet while less LNG 
input from LP pump 
Possible overpressure of 
recondenser Pressure relief valve, PSV-34 L-L  L-L 
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Node 3  LNG tank system 
 
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards 
Severity-
Probability 
(H, M, L) 
Actions 
Final 
severity-
Probability 
(H, M, L) 
reference 
Lower 
temperature 
Lower temperature 
in foundation of tank 
due to bottom 
heating failure 
Possible freezing moisture 
in the ground may lead to 
unstable foundation. 
Foundation temperature 
monitoring and low 
temperature alarm. 
H-L 
1. Check 
redundancy of 
TIA-4 
2. Check 
emergency 
electricity 
(power) 
3.Check 
automatic 
ON/OFF 
system 
H-L   
Higher 
temperature 
Operating error 
leading to 
overheating of the 
bottom heating 
system 
Overpressure in tank 
Foundation temperature 
monitoring and high, 
and high-high 
temperatures alarm 
leading to shutoff 
L-L   L-L   
Lower 
pressure 
Lower pressure due 
to pump-out without 
BOG input due to 
failure of BV-45 
(closure) 
Underpressure in tank 
may lead to vacuum 
condition. Possible 
collapse of tank 
1.Low pressure alarm 
(PIA-4) and BOG 
compressor trip 
2.Low low pressure trip 
of LP pump 
3.Two vacuum relief 
valves on tank(VRV-
46, VRV-47) 
H-L 
  
  
  
H-L 
  
 EN-1473 
(1997) 
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Node 3  Continued 
 
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards 
Severity-
Probability 
(H, M, L) 
Actions 
Final 
severity-
Probability 
(H, M, L) 
reference 
Higher 
pressure 
Rollover due to 
stratification 
Overpressure in tank and 
possible damage of tank 
1. Two pressure relief 
valves 
2. High pressure alarm 
(PIA-3) 
3. Density monitoring 
(DI-3) to prevent 
stratification 
4. Recirculation from 
other tank to prevent 
stratification 
5. Jet mixing line to 
prevent stratification 
H-L 
1. Each PSV 
should has 
independent 
pipe 
connection to 
tank 
  
  
  
  
H-L EN-1473 (1997) 
Lower 
level 
Lower level due to 
continuous pump-
out 
Lower level may cause 
cavitation and damage to 
LP pump 
Low level alarm and 
low-low level trip of LP 
pump 
L-L   L-L   
Higher 
level 
Higher level due to 
operator failure. 
Operator lines up the 
wrong tank 
Level increases and leads 
to carryover into annular 
space of LNG causing 
vaporization and then 
overpressure within the 
tank 
1. Two independent 
level measuring and 
alarm systems (H, HH) 
2. High-high level 
detection initiate the 
ESD function for feed 
pumps and valves in 
feed and recirculation 
line 
H-L   
  
H-L EN-1473 (1997) 
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APPENDIX C.   BAYESIAN-LOPA SPREADSHEETS 
 
C.1  SCENARIO 1 
 
C.1.1   BAYESIAN ESTIMATION SHEETS 
 
Initiating event 
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PFD comparison
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PFD comparison
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PFD comparison of IPL 2
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C.1.2   LOPA SPREADSHEETS 
 
Scenario No. 
 
1 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
LNG leakage from Loading arms during unloading 
Node No. 
 
1 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Release of LNG due to loading arm 
failures resulting from swivel joints 
failure and flange joints failures 
    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
Loading arm failures due to flange 
joint or swivel joint failures   2.75E-02 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    2.75E-02 
Gas detectors at the jetty and human 
intervention 9.75E-04   
Fire detector and ESD 3.68E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
     
Total PFD for all IPLs   3.59E-06   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    9.87E-08 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. Test intervals should be kept as 
following to keep the PFD (ESV: 1 
year, gas and fire detector: 1 month). 
2. The logic solver of gas and fire 
detector should be independent to get 
full credits of IPLs. Otherwise, one of 
them cannot be an IPL. 
    
Notes       
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
1 
Scenario Title: generic data (Prior) 
LNG leakage from Loading arms during unloading 
Node No. 
 
1 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Release of LNG due to loading arm 
failures resulting from swivel joints 
failure and flange joints failures 
    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
Loading arm failures due to flange 
joint or swivel joint failures   3.80E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    3.80E-03 
Gas detectors at the jetty and human 
intervention 2.35E-03   
Fire detector and ESD 2.73E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
     
Total PFD for all IPLs   6.43E-06   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    2.45E-08 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. Test intervals should be kept as 
following to keep the PFD (ESV: 1 
year, gas and fire detector: 1 
month). 
2. The logic solver of gas and fire 
detector should be independent to 
get full credits of IPLs. Otherwise, 
one of them cannot be an IPL. 
    
Notes       
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
1 
Scenario Title: Plant specific data (Likelihood) 
LNG leakage from Loading arms during unloading 
Node No. 
 
1 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Release of LNG due to loading arm 
failures resulting from swivel joints 
failure and flange joints failures 
    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
Loading arm failures due to flange 
joint or swivel joint failures   3.74E-02 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    3.74E-02 
Gas detectors at the jetty and human 
intervention 9.47E-04   
Fire detector and ESD 3.82E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
     
Total PFD for all IPLs   3.62E-06   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    1.35E-07 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. Test intervals should be kept as 
following to keep the PFD (ESV: 1 
year, gas and fire detector: 1 month). 
2. The logic solver of gas and fire 
detector should be independent to get 
full credits of IPLs. Otherwise, one of 
them cannot be an IPL. 
    
Notes       
References       
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Class. Frequency of incident scenario (/year) 
Prior 
(only generic) 2.45E-08 
Likelihood 
(only plant specific) 1.35E-07 
Posterior 
(with Bayesian) 9.87E-08 
 
 
Frequency comparison of incident scenario
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C.2  SCENARIO 2 
 
C.2.1   BAYESIAN ESTIMATION SHEETS 
 
Initiating event 
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IPL 1 
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 C.2.2   LOPA SPREADSHEETS 
 
Scenario No. 
 
2 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
Pressure increase of unloading arm due to BV-1 
failed closure during unloading 
Node No. 
 
1 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category Pressure increase of unloading arm     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
During unloading, BV-1 spurious trip 
close   5.51E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.51E-03 
A TSV along transfer line 5.26E-04   
      Independent Protection Layers 
      
Total PFD for all IPLs   5.26E-04   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    2.90E-06 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. A PSV may be installed before 
TSV, unless TSV can operate as a 
PSV in case of overpressure. 
    
Notes 
1. Unloading arm and pipe were 
designed to bear the shut-off 
pressure of ship pump. 
    
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
2 
Scenario Title: generic data (Prior) 
Pressure increase of unloading arm due to BV-1 
failed closure during unloading 
Node No. 
 
1 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category Pressure increase of unloading arm     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
During unloading, BV-1 spurious trip 
close   5.53E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.53E-03 
A TSV along transfer line 4.70E-04   
      Independent Protection Layers 
     
Total PFD for all IPLs   4.70E-04   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    2.60E-06 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. A PSV may be installed before 
TSV, unless TSV can operate as a 
PSV in case of overpressure. 
    
Notes 
1. Unloading arm and pipe were 
designed to bear the shut-off 
pressure of ship pump. 
    
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
2 
Scenario Title: Plant specific data (Likelihood) 
Pressure increase of unloading arm due to BV-1 
failed closure during unloading 
Node No. 
 
1 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category Pressure increase of unloading arm     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
During unloading, BV-1 spurious trip 
close   5.50E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.50E-03 
A TSV along transfer line 5.51E-03   
      Independent Protection Layers 
     
Total PFD for all IPLs   5.51E-03   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    3.03E-05 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) NO     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. A PSV may be installed before 
TSV, unless TSV can operate as a 
PSV in case of overpressure. 
    
Notes 
1. Unloading arm and pipe were 
designed to bear the shut-off 
pressure of ship pump. 
    
References       
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Class. Frequency of incident scenario (/year) 
Prior 
(only generic) 2.60E-06 
Likelihood 
(only plant specific) 3.03E-05 
Posterior 
(with Bayesian) 2.90E-06 
 
Frequency comparison of incident scenario
2.60E-06
3.03E-05
2.90E-06
0.00E+00
5.00E-06
1.00E-05
1.50E-05
2.00E-05
2.50E-05
3.00E-05
3.50E-05
Prior
(only generic)
Likelihood
(only plant
specific)
Posterior
(with Bayesian)
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
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C.3  SCENARIO 3 
 
C.3.1   BAYESIAN ESTIMATION SHEETS 
 
Initiating event 
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Frequency comparison
0.005510.005500.00553
0.00000
0.00200
0.00400
0.00600
0.00800
0.01000
0.01200
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Fr
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IPL 1 
 
   
  
 
197 
 
 
  
 
198 
PFD comparison
0.00210.0018
0.0022
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
0.0030
0.0035
0.0040
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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200 
 
PFD comparison
0.0088
0.00040.0002
0.0000
0.0010
0.0020
0.0030
0.0040
0.0050
0.0060
0.0070
0.0080
0.0090
0.0100
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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PFD comparison of IPL 1
0.0019 0.0025
0.0109
0.0000
0.0020
0.0040
0.0060
0.0080
0.0100
0.0120
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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 C.3.2   LOPA SPREADSHEETS 
 
Scenario No. 
 
3 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
HP pump cavitation and damage due to low 
pressure of recondenser resulting from BV-32 
failed closure. Possible leakage and fire. 
Node No. 
 
2 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
HP pump damage leading to 
possible leakage and fire     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) BV-32 spurious failed close   5.51E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.51E-03 
Low pressure alarm and HP pump 
trip 2.48E-03   
      
Independent 
Protection Layers 
      
Total PFD for all IPLs   2.48E-03   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    1.37E-05 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) NO     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. HP pump should be tripped in 
case of low-low level of 
recondenser. 
2. It is better to have HP pump of 
auto circulation type to control the 
pump out and prevent cavitation. 
3. The test intervals of pressure 
alarm and HP pump should be kept 
1 month, respectively. 
    
Notes       
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
3 
Scenario Title: Generic data (Prior) 
HP pump cavitation and damage due to low 
pressure of recondenser resulting from BV-32 failed 
closure. Possible leakage and fire. 
Node No. 
 
2 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
HP pump damage leading to 
possible leakage and fire     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) BV-32 spurious failed close   5.53E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.53E-03 
Low pressure alarm and HP pump 
trip 1.95E-03   
      
Independent 
Protection Layers 
     
Total PFD for all IPLs   1.95E-03   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    1.08E-05 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) NO     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. HP pump should be tripped in 
case of low-low level of recondenser. 
2. It is better to have HP pump of 
auto circulation type to control the 
pump out and prevent cavitation. 
3. The test intervals of pressure 
alarm and HP pump should be kept 1 
month, respectively. 
    
Notes       
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
3 
Scenario Title: Plant specific data (Likelihood) 
HP pump cavitation and damage due to low 
pressure of recondenser resulting from BV-32 failed 
closure. Possible leakage and fire. 
Node No. 
 
2 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
HP pump damage leading to possible 
leakage and fire     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) BV-32 spurious failed close   5.50E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.50E-03 
Low pressure alarm and HP pump trip 1.09E-02   
      Independent Protection Layers 
     
Total PFD for all IPLs   1.09E-02   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    6.01E-05 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) NO     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. HP pump should be tripped in case 
of low-low level of recondenser. 
2. It is better to have HP pump of 
auto circulation type to control the 
pump out and prevent cavitation. 
3. The test intervals of pressure alarm 
and HP pump should be kept 1 
month, respectively. 
    
Notes       
References       
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Class. Frequency of incident scenario (/year) 
Prior 
(only generic) 1.08E-05 
Likelihood 
(only plant specific) 6.01E-05 
Posterior 
(with Bayesian) 1.37E-05 
 
Frequency comparison of incident scenario
1.08E-05
6.01E-05
1.37E-05
0.00E+00
1.00E-05
2.00E-05
3.00E-05
4.00E-05
5.00E-05
6.00E-05
7.00E-05
Prior
(only generic)
Likelihood
(only plant
specific)
Posterior
(with Bayesian)
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
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C.4  SCENARIO 4 
 
C.4.1   BAYESIAN ESTIMATION SHEETS 
 
Initiating event 
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Frequency comparison
0.0273
0.0055 0.0058
0.0000
0.0050
0.0100
0.0150
0.0200
0.0250
0.0300
Prior Likelihood Posterior
Fr
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IPL 1 
 
  
  
 
209 
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PFD comparison
0.00033
0.00230
0.00027
0.00000
0.00050
0.00100
0.00150
0.00200
0.00250
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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IPL 2 
 
 
  
 
212 
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PFD comparison
0.0010
0.0024
0.0009
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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C.4.2   LOPA SPREADSHEETS 
 
Scenario No. 
 
4 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
Higher temperature in recondenser due to more 
BOG input resulting from FCV-33 spurious full open. 
Possible cavitation and damage of HP pump 
leading to leakage. 
Node No. 
 
2 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
LNG level increases and leads to 
carryover into annular space resulting 
in possible overpressure in tank 
    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) FCV-33 spurious full open   5.77E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.77E-03 
High temperature alarm and human 
intervention 3.34E-04   Independent Protection Layers Gas detector and human intervention 9.75E-04    
Total PFD for all IPLs   3.26E-07   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    1.88E-09 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. Gas detector should shut-off the 
BV-32 and BV-23 in case of gas 
detection. 
2. Temperature alarm and gas 
detector should be independent each 
other in order to be considered as an 
IPL, respectively. Otherwise, one of 
them cannot be credited fully as an 
IPL. 
3. The test intervals of temperature 
alarm and gas detector should be 
kept 1 month. 
    
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
4 
Scenario Title: Generic data (Prior) 
Higher temperature in recondenser due to more 
BOG input resulting from FCV-33 spurious full open. 
Possible cavitation and damage of HP pump 
leading to leakage. 
Node No. 
 
2 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
LNG level increases and leads to 
carryover into annular space resulting 
in possible overpressure in tank 
    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) FCV-33 spurious full open   2.73E-02 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    2.73E-02 
High temperature alarm and human 
intervention 2.30E-03   
Gas detector and human intervention 2.35E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
     
Total PFD for all IPLs   5.41E-06   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    1.48E-07 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. Gas detector should shut-off the 
BV-32 and BV-23 in case of gas 
detection. 
2. Temperature alarm and gas 
detector should be independent each 
other in order to be considered as an 
IPL, respectively. Otherwise, one of 
them cannot be credited fully as an 
IPL. 
3. The test intervals of temperature 
alarm and gas detector should be 
kept 1 month. 
    
Notes       
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Scenario No. 
 
4 
Scenario Title: Plant specific data (Likelihood) 
Higher temperature in recondenser due to more 
BOG input resulting from FCV-33 spurious full open. 
Possible cavitation and damage of HP pump 
leading to leakage. 
Node No. 
 
2 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
LNG level increases and leads to 
carryover into annular space resulting 
in possible overpressure in tank 
    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) FCV-33 spurious full open   5.50E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.50E-03 
High temperature alarm and human 
intervention 2.74E-04   
Gas detector and human intervention 9.47E-04   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
     
Total PFD for all IPLs   2.59E-07   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    1.43E-09 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. Gas detector should shut-off the 
BV-32 and BV-23 in case of gas 
detection. 
2. Temperature alarm and gas 
detector should be independent each 
other in order to be considered as an 
IPL, respectively. Otherwise, one of 
them cannot be credited fully as an 
IPL. 
3. The test intervals of temperature 
alarm and gas detector should be 
kept 1 month. 
    
Notes       
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Class. Frequency of incident scenario (/year) 
Prior 
(only generic) 1.48E-07 
Likelihood 
(only plant specific) 1.43E-09 
Posterior 
(with Bayesian) 1.88E-09 
 
 
Frequency comparison of incident scenario
1.43E-09 1.88E-09
1.48E-07
0.00E+00
2.00E-08
4.00E-08
6.00E-08
8.00E-08
1.00E-07
1.20E-07
1.40E-07
1.60E-07
Prior
(only generic)
Likelihood
(only plant
specific)
Posterior
(with Bayesian)
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
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C.5  SCENARIO 5 
 
C.5.1   BAYESIAN ESTIMATION SHEETS 
 
Initiating event 
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Frequency comparison
0.0191
0.01500.0130
0.0000
0.0050
0.0100
0.0150
0.0200
0.0250
0.0300
Prior Likelihood Posterior
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
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IPL 1 
 
  
  
 
221 
 
 
PFD comparison
0.000350.00028
0.00275
0.00000
0.00050
0.00100
0.00150
0.00200
0.00250
0.00300
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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PFD comparison of IPL 1
0.00828 0.00834
0.01073
0.00000
0.00200
0.00400
0.00600
0.00800
0.01000
0.01200
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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IPL 2 
 
  
  
 
224 
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PFD comparison (Pressure Alarm)
0.00210.0018 0.0022
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
0.0030
0.0035
0.0040
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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PFD comparison (ESV)
0.0012
0.0014 0.0013
0.0000
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.0010
0.0012
0.0014
0.0016
0.0018
0.0020
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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PFD comparison of IPL 2
0.00291
0.00353 0.00346
0.00000
0.00050
0.00100
0.00150
0.00200
0.00250
0.00300
0.00350
0.00400
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
 
  
 
229 
IPL 3 
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PFD comparison
0.00047 0.00053
0.00551
0.00000
0.00100
0.00200
0.00300
0.00400
0.00500
0.00600
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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PFD comparison of two PRVs with a common pipe
1.41E-04 1.58E-04
1.68E-03
0.00E+00
2.00E-04
4.00E-04
6.00E-04
8.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.20E-03
1.40E-03
1.60E-03
1.80E-03
PFD1oo2(Prior) PFD1oo2(Likelihood) PFD1oo2(Posterior)
PF
D
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PFD comparison of two PRVs with independent pipes
3.58E-05
8.02E-076.91E-07
0.00E+00
5.00E-06
1.00E-05
1.50E-05
2.00E-05
2.50E-05
3.00E-05
3.50E-05
4.00E-05
PFD1oo2(Prior) PFD1oo2(Likelihood) PFD1oo2(Posterior)
PF
D
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Comparison of PFD with no. of PRVs
5.26E-04
1.58E-04
8.02E-07
0.00E+00
1.00E-04
2.00E-04
3.00E-04
4.00E-04
5.00E-04
6.00E-04
PFD1oo1(one PRV) PFD1oo2(two
PRVs, common
pipe)
PFD1oo2(two
PRVs, independent
pipe)
PF
D
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C.5.2   LOPA SPREADSHEETS 
 
Scenario No. 
 
5 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
Overpressure in tank due to rollover resulting from 
stratification and possible damage in tank 
Node No. 
 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Overpressure in tank and possible 
damage     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) Rollover due to stratification   1.50E-02 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    1.50E-02 
Density monitoring and jet 
mixing(FCV) 8.34E-03   
High pressure alarm and trip inlet line 
valve(EMOV) 3.46E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
Two pressure relief valves 1.58E-04   
Total PFD for all IPLs   4.56E-09   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    6.86E-11 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. If each PRV has its own pipeline 
connection to a storage tank to be 
independent each other, the PFD of 
two PRVs can be reduced. 
2. The logic solver of density 
monitoring and pressure alarm should 
be independent to get full credits of 
IPLs. Otherwise, one of them cannot 
be an IPL. 
    
Notes       
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
5 
Scenario Title: generic data (Prior) 
Overpressure in tank due to rollover resulting from 
stratification and possible damage in tank 
Node No. 
 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Overpressure in tank and possible 
damage     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) Rollover due to stratification   1.30E-02 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    1.30E-02 
Density monitoring and jet 
mixing(FCV) 8.28E-03   
High pressure alarm and trip inlet line 
valve(EMOV) 2.91E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
Two pressure relief valves 1.41E-04   
Total PFD for all IPLs   3.41E-09   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    4.43E-11 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. If each PRV has its own pipeline 
connection to a storage tank to be 
independent each other, the PFD of 
two PRVs can be reduced. 
2. The logic solver of density 
monitoring and pressure alarm 
should be independent to get full 
credits of IPLs. Otherwise, one of 
them cannot be an IPL. 
    
Notes       
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
5 
Scenario Title: Plant specific data (Likelihood) 
Overpressure in tank due to rollover resulting from 
stratification and possible damage in tank  
Node No. 
 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Overpressure in tank and possible 
damage     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) Rollover due to stratification   1.91E-02 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    1.91E-02 
Density monitoring and jet 
mixing(FCV) 1.07E-02   
High pressure alarm and trip inlet line 
valve(EMOV) 3.13E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
Two pressure relief valves 1.68E-03   
Total PFD for all IPLs   5.65E-08   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    1.08E-09 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. If each PRV has its own pipeline 
connection to a storage tank to be 
independent each other, the PFD of 
two PRVs can be reduced. 
2. The logic solver of density 
monitoring and pressure alarm should 
be independent to get full credits of 
IPLs. Otherwise, one of them cannot 
be an IPL. 
    
Notes       
References       
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Class. Frequency of incident scenario (/year) 
Prior 
(only generic) 4.43E-11 
Likelihood 
(only plant specific) 1.08E-09 
Posterior 
(with Bayesian) 6.86E-11 
 
 
Frequency comparison of incident scenario
4.43E-11 6.86E-11
1.08E-09
0.00E+00
2.00E-10
4.00E-10
6.00E-10
8.00E-10
1.00E-09
1.20E-09
Prior
(only generic)
Likelihood
(only plant
specific)
Posterior
(with Bayesian)
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
(/y
ea
r)
 
  
 
238 
C.6  SCENARIO 6 
 
C.6.1   BAYESIAN ESTIMATION SHEETS 
 
Initiating event 
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Frequency comparison
0.0344 0.0353
0.0000
0.0100
0.0200
0.0300
0.0400
0.0500
0.0600
Prior Likelihood Posterior
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
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IPL 1 
 
 
  
 
241 
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PFD comparison
0.0201
0.0239
0.0259
0.0000
0.0050
0.0100
0.0150
0.0200
0.0250
0.0300
0.0350
0.0400
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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PFD comparison of two level alarms 
1.41E-03
1.77E-031.96E-03
0.00E+00
5.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.50E-03
2.00E-03
2.50E-03
PFD1oo2(Prior) PFD1oo2(Likelihood) PFD1oo2(Posterior)
PF
D
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PFD comparison of IPL 1
0.0026
0.0022
0.0028
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
0.0030
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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IPL 2 
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PFD comparison
0.0201
0.02390.0259
0.0000
0.0050
0.0100
0.0150
0.0200
0.0250
0.0300
0.0350
0.0400
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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PFD comparison of two level detectors
1.41E-03
1.77E-03
1.96E-03
0.00E+00
5.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.50E-03
2.00E-03
2.50E-03
PFD1oo2(Prior) PFD1oo2(Likelihood) PFD1oo2(Posterior)
PF
D
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249 
   
 
PFD comparison (ESV)
0.0012
0.0014 0.0013
0.0000
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.0010
0.0012
0.0014
0.0016
0.0018
0.0020
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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PFD comparison of IPL 2
0.0026
0.0031
0.0033
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
0.0030
0.0035
0.0040
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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C.6.2   LOPA SPREADSHEETS 
 
Scenario No. 
 
6 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
LNG level increases and leads to carryover into 
annular space of LNG because operator lines up the 
wrong tank. Possible overpressure in tank. 
Node No. 
 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
LNG level increases and leads to 
carryover into annular space resulting 
in possible overpressure in tank 
    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
Human errors (operator lines up the 
wrong tank)   3.53E-02 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    3.53E-02 
Two independent level alarms and 
human intervention 2.57E-03   
Two high-high level detector and ESD 
of BV-40 3.10E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
      
Total PFD for all IPLs   7.94E-06   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    2.80E-07 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. The test intervals of level alarm and 
detector should be kept 1 year and 
BV should have 1 month test interval. 
2. Level alarms and detectors should 
be independent of each other in order 
to keep the risk value. 
    
Notes       
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
6 
Scenario Title: Generic data (Prior) 
LNG level increases and leads to carryover into 
annular space of LNG because operator lines up the 
wrong tank. Possible overpressure in tank. 
Node No. 
 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
LNG level increases and leads to 
carryover into annular space resulting 
in possible overpressure in tank 
    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
Human errors (operator lines up the 
wrong tank)   undefined 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    undefined 
Two independent level alarms and 
human intervention 2.21E-03   
Two high-high level detector and 
ESD of BV-40 2.57E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
     
Total PFD for all IPLs   5.66E-06   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    undefined 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No)       
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. The test intervals of level alarm 
and detector should be kept 1 year 
and BV should have 1 month test 
interval. 
2. Level alarms and detectors should 
be independent of each other in order 
to keep the risk value. 
    
Notes       
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
6 
Scenario Title: Plant specific data (Likelihood) 
LNG level increases and leads to carryover into 
annular space of LNG because operator lines up the 
wrong tank. Possible overpressure in tank. 
Node No. 
 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
LNG level increases and leads to 
carryover into annular space resulting 
in possible overpressure in tank 
    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
Human errors (operator lines up the 
wrong tank)   3.44E-02 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    3.44E-02 
Two independent level alarms and 
human intervention 2.76E-03   
Two high-high level detector and ESD 
of BV-40 3.33E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
     
Total PFD for all IPLs   9.21E-06   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    3.16E-07 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. The test intervals of level alarm 
and detector should be kept 1 year 
and BV should have 1 month test 
interval. 
2. Level alarms and detectors should 
be independent of each other in order 
to keep the risk value. 
    
Notes       
References       
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Class. Frequency of incident scenario (/year) 
Prior 
(only generic) undefined 
Likelihood 
(only plant specific) 3.16E-07 
Posterior 
(with Bayesian) 2.80E-07 
 
 
Frequency comparison of incident scenario
2.80E-073.16E-07
undefined
0.00E+00
5.00E-08
1.00E-07
1.50E-07
2.00E-07
2.50E-07
3.00E-07
3.50E-07
Prior
(only generic)
Likelihood
(only plant
specific)
Posterior
(with Bayesian)
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
(/y
ea
r)
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C.7  SCENARIO 7 
 
C.7.1   BAYESIAN ESTIMATION SHEETS 
 
Initiating event 
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Frequency comparison
0.00553 0.005510.00550
0.00000
0.00200
0.00400
0.00600
0.00800
0.01000
0.01200
Prior Likelihood Posterior
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
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IPL 1 
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PFD comparison
0.00210.00220.0018
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
0.0030
0.0035
0.0040
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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PFD comparison
0.0189
0.0002
0.0029
0.0000
0.0020
0.0040
0.0060
0.0080
0.0100
0.0120
0.0140
0.0160
0.0180
0.0200
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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PFD comparison of IPL 1
0.0020
0.0211
0.0050
0.0000
0.0050
0.0100
0.0150
0.0200
0.0250
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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IPL 2 
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PFD comparison
0.0018 0.0021
0.0022
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
0.0030
0.0035
0.0040
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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PFD comparison
0.0088
0.00040.0002
0.0000
0.0010
0.0020
0.0030
0.0040
0.0050
0.0060
0.0070
0.0080
0.0090
0.0100
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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PFD comparison of IPL 2
0.0019 0.0025
0.0109
0.0000
0.0020
0.0040
0.0060
0.0080
0.0100
0.0120
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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IPL 3 
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PFD comparison
0.00053
0.00551
0.00047
0.00000
0.00100
0.00200
0.00300
0.00400
0.00500
0.00600
Prior Likelihood Posterior
PF
D
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Total PFD comparison
6.91E-07
3.58E-05
8.02E-07
0.00E+00
5.00E-06
1.00E-05
1.50E-05
2.00E-05
2.50E-05
3.00E-05
3.50E-05
4.00E-05
PFD1oo2(Prior) PFD1oo2(Likelihood) PFD1oo2(Posterior)
PF
D
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C.7.2   LOPA SPREADSHEETS 
 
Scenario No. 
 
7 
Scenario Title: Posterior (Bayesian estimation) 
Underpressure in tank due to pump-out without 
BOG input resulting from BV-45 failed closure. 
Damage of tank 
Node No. 
 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Underpressure in tank and possible 
damage of tank     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
LP pump-out without BOG input due 
to BV-25 spurious failed closure   5.51E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.51E-03 
Low pressure alarm and BOG 
compressor trip 5.01E-03   
Low-low pressure detector and LP 
pump trip 2.48E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
Two vacuum relief valves 8.02E-07   
Total PFD for all IPLs   9.98E-12   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    5.50E-14 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. The logic solver of pressure alarm 
and detector should be independent 
to get full credits of IPLs. Otherwise, 
one of them cannot be an IPL. 
    
Notes 
For two vacuum relief valves, 
common cause factors were 
considered, but the PFD of them is 
still very small because the common 
cause factor is only 0.1% according 
to expert judgments. 
    
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
7 
Scenario Title: generic data (Prior) 
Underpressure in tank due to pump-out without 
BOG input resulting from BV-45 failed closure. 
Possible damage of tank 
Node No. 
 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Underpressure in tank and possible 
damage of tank     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
LP pump-out without BOG input due 
to BV-25 spurious fail closure   5.53E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.53E-03 
Low pressure alarm and BOG 
compressor trip 1.99E-03   
Low-low pressure detector and LP 
pump trip 1.95E-03   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
Two vacuum relief valves 6.91E-07   
Total PFD for all IPLs   2.67E-12   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    1.48E-14 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. The logic solver of pressure alarm 
and detector should be independent 
to get full credits of IPLs. Otherwise, 
one of them cannot be an IPL. 
    
Notes 
For two vacuum relief valves, 
common cause factors were 
considered, but the PFD of them is 
still very small because the common 
cause factor is only 0.1% according 
to expert judgments. 
    
References       
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Scenario No. 
 
7 
Scenario Title: Plant specific data (Likelihood) 
Underpressure in tank due to pump-out without 
BOG input resulting from BV-45 failed closure. 
Possible damage of tank 
Node No. 
 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Underpressure in tank and possible 
damage of tank     
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
Action required 
Tolerable   
> 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
LP pump-out without BOG input due 
to BV-25 spurious failed closure   5.50E-03 
Enabling event 
or condition N/A     
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
    5.50E-03 
Low pressure alarm and BOG 
compressor trip 2.11E-02   
Low-low pressure detector and LP 
pump trip 1.09E-02   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
Two vacuum relief valves 3.58E-05   
Total PFD for all IPLs   8.24E-09   
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
    4.54E-11 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES     
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
1. The logic solver of pressure alarm 
and detector should be independent 
to get full credits of IPLs. Otherwise, 
one of them cannot be an IPL. 
    
Notes 
For two vacuum relief valves, 
common cause factors were 
considered, but the PFD of them is 
still very small because the common 
cause factor is only 0.1% according 
to expert judgments. 
    
References       
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Class. Frequency of incident scenario (/year) 
Prior 
(only generic) 1.48E-14 
Likelihood 
(only plant specific) 4.54E-11 
Posterior 
(with Bayesian) 5.50E-14 
 
 
Frequency comparison of incident scenario
1.48E-14
4.54E-11
5.50E-14
0.00E+00
5.00E-12
1.00E-11
1.50E-11
2.00E-11
2.50E-11
3.00E-11
3.50E-11
4.00E-11
4.50E-11
5.00E-11
Prior
(only generic)
Likelihood
(only plant
specific)
Posterior
(with Bayesian)
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
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